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ABSTRACT
This report documents the reported contents of the Three Mile Island 
Unit 2 (TMI-2) canisters. proposed packaging, and degradation scenarios 
expected in the repository. 
Most fuels within the U.S. Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel 
inventory deal with highly enriched uranium, that in most cases require some 
form of neutronic poisoning inside the fuel canister. The TMI-2 fuel represents a 
departure from these fuel forms due to its lower enrichment (2.96% max.) values 
and the disrupted nature of the fuel itself.
Criticality analysis of these fuel canisters has been performed over the 
years to reflect conditions expected during transit from the reactor to the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, water pool storage,1 and 
transport/dry-pack storage at Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering 
Center.2,3 None of these prior analyses reflect the potential disposal conditions for 
this fuel inside a postclosure repository. 
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SUMMARY 
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) fuel canisters represent a significant 
MTHM quantity of fuel intended for repository disposal. Within this grouping, 
there are three different types of canisters. There are three types of TMI canisters 
under consideration for disposal in the national repository. 
This document provides details of the parameters of the various TMI 
canister types needed to perform a criticality analysis. Furthermore, the document 
also stipulates the conditions anticipated for degradation failures within the 
repository that must be addressed in the criticality analysis prior to acceptance of 
this spent nuclear fuel in the repository. 
The knockout canister with a full assembly’s worth of fuel pellets has been 
selected as the bounding case for criticality analysis. The knockout canister 
design offers fewer constraints for fuel pellet distribution and obtaining optimal 
modernization due to the greater free volume for moderator. Any such modeling 
should investigate optimized fuel distribution and moderator ratios toward 
investigating maximum reactivity. 
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FOREWORD 
The work done in this characterization effort and the planned criticality 
analysis complements previous criticality analyses done for other U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) fuel types. These studies are intended to 
demonstrate an ability to qualify the DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters 
from a criticality safety standpoint for the licensed duration of the national 
repository. 
The approach taken in previous analyses employed a combination of five 
defense high-level waste glass logs (located peripherally) and a single DOE SNF 
canister in the center position in a waste package. This combination of canisters 
makes up what is referred to as a codisposal waste package. The type of fuel 
determines the length of the SNF canisters (either 10 or 15 ft). The length of the 
high-level waste glass canisters (either 10 or 15 ft) will be dependent on the glass 
production facility. 
Prior criticality analyses have been directed at qualifying single SNF 
canisters for conceived (probable) configurations inside a codisposal package. 
These configurations range from intact fuels to totally degraded SNF canister 
contents (either fuel or basket or both), mixing degraded high-level waste into the 
SNF canister, and distribution of degraded fissile material outside the SNF 
canister but within the waste package. 
The TMI canisters present low-enriched fuels in an already degraded 
condition due to the damage incurred during the TMI-2 reactor accident. The 
material in any given canister cannot be verified in terms of actual condition or 
position. This analysis will focus on identifying an acceptable fissile loading 
supposition. A subsequent analysis will then use known and postulated fuel 
canister parameters to identify a most reactive configuration within the expected 
repository environment. 
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ACRONYMS
BOL beginning-of-life 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
EOL end-of-life 
GPU General Public Utilities (TMI operator) 
HLW high-level waste (glass) 
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
INTEC Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center 
MCNP Monte Carlo N-Particle 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
ORIGEN Oak Ridge Isotope Generation 
PWR pressurized water reactor 
SNF spent nuclear fuel 
SNM special nuclear material 
TMI Three Mile Island 
TMI-2 Three Mile Island Unit 2 
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NOMENCLATURE
Active length portion of a fuel rod or pin that contains fissionable material  
Borosilicate glass generic description of solidified waste form from radioactive liquid waste 
Burnup a measure of the amount of fissile material consumed before the fuel element is 
removed from the reactor 
Codisposal the combination of both defense high-level waste and U.S. Department of Energy 
spent nuclear fuel in a single waste package 
Filter canister separated fine particulate from the water stream once it has passed through the 
knockout canister 
Fuel canister also known as a defueling canister by its “D” designation; contains damaged Three 
Mile Island fuel assemblies 
Goethite a ferric oxide hydroxy [FeO(OH)] that forms upon iron decomposition inside a 
breached waste package 
Knockout canister used to disengage particulate that was hydro-vacuumed from the reactor vessel 
LiCon “light” concrete; grout mix found inside “D” type Three Mile Island canisters 
MTHM metric tonnes heavy metal 
Postbreach clay high-level waste degraded glass plus materials from degraded spent nuclear fuel 
canister contents 
Prebreach clay high-level waste degraded glass without fuel degradation products 
SNF canister a standard canister design that will employ a variety of internals to accommodate 
the variety of DOE spent nuclear fuels 
Waste package the engineered barrier surrounding either commercial spent nuclear fuel, or a 
combination of DOE spent nuclear fuel and defense high-level waste 
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TMI Fuel Characteristics for Disposal 
Criticality Analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) canisters (344) were generated as a result of recovery and 
cleanup of a reactor core after the TMI-2 accident. The physical dimensions of the TMI-2 canisters are 
such that not more than a single, intact commercial 15 u 15 Babcock & Wilcox pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) fuel assembly could be installed in any one package. Indeed, there were 177 assemblies in the 
initial reactor core load and a total of 344 TMI-2 core fuel canisters.4
Of the original 344 TMI-2 canisters shipped to the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), 341 have been dried and shipped to a Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC)-licensed facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). 
Of the three remaining canisters, two were consolidated into one canister.5 The other two canisters remain 
in other storage pending identification of a disposal path. 
There is no documented information indicating that even one, intact PWR assembly was ever 
installed in any TMI-2 canister. The highest reported physical mass of debris inside any canister 
(842.18 kg) (see Reference 4) represents 123% of the specified weight of an intact PWR assembly (see 
Appendix B). The highest reported fissile loading in any TMI-2 canister (10.06 kg) is only 73.3% of a 
beginning-of-life (BOL) fissile load for a PWR assembly with maximum enrichment (2.96%). The 
maximum BOL U-235 in any TMI-2 assembly of 13.72 kg will provide the basis for any single package 
criticality analysis conducted with TMI-2 canisters. 
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2. REACTOR INFORMATION 
2.1 Three Mile Island Unit 2 
The TMI-2 nuclear reactor was a Babcock & Wilcox PWR design. The core for this reactor 
consisted of 177 15 u 15 Babcock & Wilcox PWR assemblies. As a basis of operation for a new reactor, 
the PWR assemblies were constructed with decreased uranium enrichments comparable to what might be 
expected in a reactor with decreased reactivity as it approaches a typical refueling operation. These 
starting enrichments were 2.96% (max), 2.64%, and 1.98% (see Reference 4). Low power testing leading 
up to the limited operating time suggests approximately 10% of the useful life of the assemblies had been 
used at the time of the accident. Operational problems and subsequent attempts to recover operations after 
the reactor scram led to a partial draining loss of cooling water. This series of events led in turn to a 
partial meltdown of the fuel assemblies and damage to the reactor internals because of the latent heat in 
the reactor core. 
2.1.1 Accident Recovery 
After the reactor core melt down, initial recovery operations focused on stabilizing the core in a 
safe configuration. Follow up investigation included a determination of the condition of the core and what 
operations would be required to remove the radioactive portion of the resultant debris. 
2.1.2 Core Removal 
For core debris pieces that could be handled or grappled with underwater, remote tools were used 
to physically place the debris into a set of canisters with a “D” designation. Much of the core melting 
occurred in the center portion of the core, although damage appears to have intruded into even the 
peripheral assemblies. Later stages of core recovery included hydro-vacuuming operations of debris and 
this material was collected in the knockout canisters before flow was directed to filter canisters. A more 
detailed description of these canisters is presented in Section 3 of this report. 
The tare weight and filled weight of each canister were recorded (see Reference 4). The materials 
loaded into the knockout canisters could not be characterized because the pieces entrained in the water 
stream were not suitable for sizing or accounting other than total added weight to each knockout canister. 
The filter canisters (those with an “F” designator) are the least heavily loaded of any of the canisters 6 and 
have never factored into any criticality calculations (see Reference 4). 
DOE/SNF/REP-084  September 2003 
Revision 0  Page 21 of 57 
3. FUEL INFORMATION 
3.1 PWR Fuel Assembly 
The PWR assemblies associated with the TMI-2 core represented a startup core in a new reactor, 
so maximum enrichment values are somewhat less than those found in a typical refueling situation. The 
description of the standard PWR assembly is of importance in understanding the quantity of materials 
associated with an intact assembly. This information provides the basis of subsequent assumptions needed 
to support calculations that detail fissile material distributions for criticality modeling. 
3.1.1 Fuel Assembly Structure 
Each TMI assembly consisted of a 15 u 15-pin square array for a total of 225 fuel pin locations. 
During manufacturing of the assembly, only an average of 208 of these 225 pins is filled. Therefore, the 
total quantity of heavy metal installed in a typical assembly actually occupies a slightly smaller volume 
than that occupied by the displaced volume of 225 pins. Location of the “empty” pins should be 
represented with an assumption of their uniform distribution throughout the assembly (see Appendix B 
for referenced information). 
The typical fuel assembly used in the TMI-2 was a Babcock & Wilcox 15 u 15-rod array inside a 
216.92-mm (8.54-in.) square envelope (see Figure 1 for a depiction of a typical PWR assembly). 
Although this array produces a total count of 225 rods per assembly, the manufacturer specification 
(Appendix B) indicates that typically only 204 of the rods are filled with uranium oxide pellets. While the 
total assembly is 4,206.24 mm (165.6 in.) long, and the individual rod lengths are 3,942.08 mm 
(155.2 in.), the active length of each rod is listed as 3,657.6 mm (144.0 in.). The selection of the 
specifications for a typical Babcock & Wilcox PWR assembly is based on the desire to model the system 
with more pellets. This higher pellet count could be considered to be more representative of the debris 
containing damaged fuel pellets. The important consideration in this decision was ensuring the total fissile 
mass was in agreement between the Babcock & Wilcox specification and the TMI-2 fuel specification. 
How this material ends up being distributed in terms of pellet quantities, porosities, pitch spacing , etc., 
all provide for an added degree of conservatism in the model construct. 
3.1.2 Material Properties 
Each fuel assembly is constructed of various metallic components, and in the case of the fuel 
matrix, an oxide of uranium. The details of these components are identified in the following sections of 
this report. All these items play an integral role in construction of a criticality analysis model for any 
intact assembly. For the damaged assemblies and debris layers inside any of the TMI-2 canisters, their 
omission generally promotes added conservatisms to the calculations for the remaining fuel matrix within 
each canister. 
3.1.2.1 Cladding. TMI fuel cladding (Appendix B) was composed of Zircaloy-4 (Appendix A, 
Table A-7), but its presence in the TMI canister would be of more value for moderator exclusion when 
accounted for as a weight percent distributed throughout the package debris rather than as intact tubes in 
an assembly. For design purposes, and sake of reference, the cladding is 10.92 mm (0.430 in.) in diameter 
and had a thickness of 0.67 mm (0.0265 in.). These dimensions result in a fuel-clad gap of 0.107 mm 
(0.0042 in.). The fuel pins are installed in a square array with a pitch dimension of 14.43 mm (0.568 in.) 
(see Appendix B for referenced information).
The environment inside the reactor core during the thermal degradation created a complex 
chemical system. The reported formation of a hydrogen bubble in the reactor headspace immediately after  
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Figure 1. Typical pressurized water reactor fuel assembly.  
Note: TMI-2 fuel assembly dimensions (see Appendix D for detail) vary slightly from the dimensions 
shown in this figure. 
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the accident suggests significant hydrolysis of water into its basic components of hydrogen and oxygen. A 
small portion of the metallic zirconium is postulated to have oxidized to zirconium dioxide (ZrO2) (see 
Reference 6). Such oxide would likely be distributed throughout the canisters, but the quantities in any 
given canister are highly variable. Neglecting its presence in any canister would provide a conservative 
basis for the criticality calculations. 
3.1.2.2 Fuel matrix. The fuel matrix is composed of cylindrical pellets that have dished ends and 
chamfered edges. The pellets are composed of uranium dioxide (UO2) with an O/U ratio of 2-2.02:1. The 
theoretical density of uranium dioxide is reported to be 10.97 g/cc.7 Reported production density that is 
95% of theoretical; the production specification identifies an open porosity of <1%. (see Appendix B for 
referenced information).
Each pellet has a specified diameter of 9.362 mm (0.3686 in.) and a length of 11.05 mm 
(0.435 in.). Within each pin, the active length can best be described as a stacked column of uranium oxide 
pellets. Dividing the active length of 3,601.7 mm (141.8 in.) by the pellet length of 11.05 mm (0.435 in.) 
results in a calculated 325.98 pellets in a stack. This analysis assumes there are 325 pellets per pin. The 
fractional pellet count will be accounted for as gaps created by accumulated gaps between pellets in the 
stack. The total heavy metal mass will be modeled as individual, cylindrical pellets. The total number of 
pellets to be modeled in a canister would be 208 u 325 = 67,600. Each pin is listed as weighing 3.17 kg 
(7.00 lb) and contains a fuel matrix of 2.53 kg (5.58 lb) within each pin. With the exception of stainless 
steel springs (0.042 lb) inside the end of each pin, the balance of weight (7.00 – 5.58 = 1.42 lb) can be 
attributed to cladding material of Zircaloy-4. A total assembly weight equals 687.1 kg (1,515 lb) (see 
Appendix B for reference specification). 
For purposes of modeling within the fuel canister (‘D’ designator), the available volume within 
each fuel canister is limited to the displaced volume described by the dimensional envelope of a single 
intact, PWR assembly (see Reference 1). A conservative approach to criticality modeling would neglect 
the metallic components of the assembly (due to moderator displacement) and assume a redistribution of 
the equivalent number of assembly pellets within the fuel canister. 
The fuel matrix mass loaded into a single, intact PWR fuel assembly should provide the basis for 
calculating any criticality scenario associated with the TMI-2 canisters. The original design for the TMI-2 
fuel canister provided the space or volume inside a canister to the equivalent of a single, intact PWR 
assembly. There is no information to confirm reactor recovery operations retrieved any completely intact 
assemblies from the core. Therefore, it should only be necessary to demonstrate (through data submittal 
prior to shipment) that none of the TMI-2 canisters contains more than either the total uranium or total 
fissile uranium (BOL) present in an intact assembly.
The specified quantities of total uranium and U-235 at 2.96% enrichment in a single 
15 u 15 PWR assembly are 463.63 kg (1,022.12 lb) and 13.72 kg (30.25 lb) respectively (Appendix B). 
While reported enrichments of 2.64% and 1.98% exist for some of the assemblies, 2.96% enrichment is 
considered the bounding case and will be used for all criticality modeling. Any ingrowth of Pu-239 is 
considered minimal in relation to the burnup experienced by the various assemblies. The concentration of 
Pu-239 at the ~10% burnup levels is considered to be bounded by the assumption that a full, intact 
assembly of maximum enrichment is present in any TMI canister, e.g., TMI canister U-235 fissile 
(10.06 kg max) + 0.900 kg Pu-239 < 13.72 kg U-235 in PWR assembly. 
The GPU reported uranium quantities (see Reference 4) that are in general agreement with the 
BOL uranium loadings that can be calculated from the Babcock & Wilcox fuel specifications.8–10 With 
177 assemblies in a reactor core, this yields a total uranium mass of 82,047.73 kg (180,915.24 lb) at BOL. 
This quantity compares within 1.0% of the 82,945 kg uranium mass reported (see Reference 4) in earlier 
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studies related to fission product inventories estimated in the TMI-2 core at the time of the accident. 
While the 82,945 kg total uranium exceeds the Babcock & Wilcox specification, it does provide 
confirmation of the degree of accountability for heavy metals loaded into the TMI canisters. The total 
uranium of an intact fuel assembly represents a greater uranium loading than that shown in Table 1; this 
offers further support that using the fissile loading of an intact assembly represents a conservative basis 
for configuration modeling. 
3.1.2.3 Other Materials. Other materials used in construction of the commercial PWR fuel 
assemblies include stainless steels (304 or 304L or 316), Zircaloy-4, and Inconel 718. Quantity and mass 
of specific items for this fuel assembly hardware are detailed in Appendix B, Table B-1.
The use of any of these materials in the reactor core is selected for their serviceability in a reactor 
environment and neutronic neutrality. Within a fuel canister, they would have little effect on the system 
neutronics other than the displacement of moderator, whether intact or degraded. For the knockout 
canister, the assumption for system modeling ignored the presence of such materials. Rather it was 
assumed the expected materials within the knockout canister would be the loose fuel pellets. These pellets 
were transported to the canister during the hydraulic cleanout phase of the reactor vessel. 
Table 1. GPU reported heavy metal inventory. 
   
Total for the Corea
(kg)
Calculated Canister Averageb
(kg)
 U (total)  81,437.393  238.82  
 U-235  1,801.131  5.28  
 Pu (total)  158.202  0.464  
 Pu-239–241  147.784  0.433  
 U + Pu (total) heavy metal  81,595.595  239.28  
a. See Reference 4. 
b. Based on a TMI-2 canister count of 341 in dry storage. 
3.2 TMI Defueling Canisters 
The TMI defueling operations employed three types of canisters to facilitate removal and storage 
of core materials that were damaged during the thermal excursion. These canisters were standardized 
relative to external dimensions (length, diameter) and features (connections, lifting points). However, the 
internal design features differed between canisters because of the functions they were expected to 
perform.  
The TMI-2 reactor had a core that consisted of 177 assemblies. The number of TMI-2 canisters 
created as a result of debris removal from the degraded reactor core generated a canister count of 344. 
These canisters contain the fuel from the assemblies, but also assembly end-fittings, support posts, in-core 
guide tubes, grid supports, nozzles, and the remnants of the core structure. The canisters generated as a 
result of reactor core cleanup consist of three types: fuel (debris), filter, and knockout canisters. While 
differing in use and application, the external dimensions of all TMI-2 canisters were the same. 
Defueling operations of the TMI-2 core resulted in the filling of 343 canisters of all types (see 
Figure 2), each with their own particular designation and numerical code. Subsequent consolidation of 
two of these canisters (see Reference 5) at the INEEL resulted in shipment of 341 canisters from the wet  
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Figure 2. Schematic cross section of TMI-2 canister types. 
storage pools at Test Area North to the INTEC dry storage facility. Two TMI canisters remain in storage 
at Test Area North. 
The basic structure of the TMI canister centers on a 14-in. Schedule 10 pipe (355.6-mm outer 
diameter and 6.35-mm wall thickness). The bottom of the canister is a reversed dish head with a 
9.525-mm (0.375-in.) thickness. The top of the canister is a 101.6-mm (4-in.) thick metal plate with 
penetrations and hardware connections suitable for hydraulic loading and dewatering. All structural 
canister materials used 304L stainless steel for canister construction (see Reference Drawings 19).
3.2.1 Fuel Canister Construction Details 
The D-type canisters have a sleeve structure located in the center of the canister that has internal 
dimensions of 231.78 mm (9.125 in.) square and a useable length of 3,465.51 mm (136-7/16 in.) that will 
accommodate a full-size TMI PWR element (see Reference 3). The chord sections between the internal 
sleeve and the inside of the TMI canister are filled with LiCon (see Reference 2). 
The overall height of the fuel canister is 3,803.65 mm (149-3/4 in.). The outer diameter of the 
canister is 355.6 mm (14 in.) and a wall thickness of 6.35 mm (0.25 in.) as determined by the use of 14-in. 
Schedule 10 pipe for the outer shell (see Reference 1). 
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3.2.2 Fuel Canister 
The fuel canisters with the “D” prefix comprise 268 of the 341 total canisters currently in dry 
storage. These canisters comprise the bulk of core materials that were of a size that enabled grappling, 
could be picked up, or remotely handled. Such debris could be represented by nearly intact fuel 
assemblies all the way down to shards, metal remnants, end fixtures, pieces of the core support structure, 
etc.
Materials of construction employ a variety of the 300 series stainless steels, and those in turn are 
predominated by the use of 304L type stainless. The internal sleeve is a seal-welded sandwich of 304L 
stainless steel that completely encompasses the Boral (boron aluminide) layers (see Reference 10). 
3.2.2.1 Materials Loading. The heavy metals content of each fuel canister is detailed in 
Appendix C. The total uranium values range from a maximum of 402.7 + 42.7 kg in the D-330 canister 
down to 0.0 kg for the D-139 and D-160 canisters.
3.2.3 Knockout Canister 
The “K” prefix relates to the knockout canisters that were used in association with 
wet-vacuuming operations used to remove loose debris that did not lend itself to physical grappling. The 
quantity of knockout canisters totals 12, one of which reportedly contains the highest total uranium 
loading of any TMI-2 canister (Appendix C, Table C-1). Figure 3 depicts the details of the knockout 
canister.
3.2.3.1 Knockout Canister Construction Details. The canisters with the “K” prefix have large 
internal diameters over which fuel matrix material is not constrained as it is in the D-type canisters. The 
internal assembly is designed to support five internal tubes with boron carbide (B4C) poisoning. The 
larger center tube consists of a 73.03-mm (2.875-in.) diameter tube with a 7.92-mm (0.312-in.) wall 
thickness and a length of 3,371.85 mm (132.75 in.). The large center “A” tube has an internal tube 
diameter of 53.98 mm (2.125 in.) with a 1.60-mm (0.063-in.) wall thickness and is filled with boron 
carbide (B4C) pellets. The four outer “B” rods are centered approximately 63.50 mm (2.50 in.) in the 
X-Y plane from the vessel centerline. These peripheral tubes have a 33.35-mm (1.313-in.) outer diameter 
with a 6.35-mm (0.25-in.) wall thickness with a minimum length of 3,327.4 mm (131 in.). The seven 
intermediate support plates are held in place by the poison rods, and the plates are spaced approximately 
406.4 mm (16 in.) apart with a 12.7-mm (0.5-in.) plate thickness. The single, bottom support plate has a 
340.52-mm (13-13/32-in.) diameter and a 31.75-mm (1.25-in.) thickness (see Reference 1 and Reference 
Drawings 19).
Once again, most of the materials of construction employ 300 series stainless steels, and all of 
them are expected to perform similarly given the same corrosion conditions. 
3.2.3.2 Materials Loading. The heavy metals content of each knockout canister is detailed in 
Appendix C. The total uranium values range from a maximum of 441.9 + 99.9 kg in the K-506 canister 
down to 0.0 kg for the K-523 canister.
3.2.4 Filter Canister 
Subsequent and downstream collection of the vacuumed debris stream then passed through a 
filter canister with an “F” designator. These filter canisters represent the least heavily loaded for either 
total uranium or U-235 per package and, in several cases, are reported to have no uranium contained 
within. There were 61 such filter canisters transferred to the dry storage inventory at INTEC. 
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Figure 3. Composite drawing of knockout canister details.  
3.2.4.1 Filter Canister Construction Details. The outer dimensions (length and diameter) of the 
filter canister are maintained consistent to those associated with the fuel and knockout canisters. The 
external materials of construction also use 304L stainless steel (see Reference 1).
Internals of the filter canister were designed to separate entrained particles and particulate fines 
from the hydraulic stream used to hydro-vacuum the TMI-2 core. Regardless of the canister internal 
details, the free volume inside the filter canister remains essentially the same as the knockout canister if 
the internals of the knockout canister are ignored. The total uranium load inside any filter canister 
(maximum) is only 46% of a PWR assembly and only 48.8% of the total uranium reported for the K-506 
knockout canister. 
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3.2.4.2 Filter Canister Materials Loading. The heavy metals content of each filter canister is 
detailed in Appendix C. The total uranium values range from a maximum of 215.60 + 48.7 kg in the 
F-471 canister down to 0.0 kg for various filter canisters.
3.3 Core Debris 
As a result of the debris removal from the TMI-2 core, part of that work provided estimates of the 
various quantities of special nuclear material (SNM) in each canister. General Public Utilities (GPU) 
provided their own set of fuel assembly characteristics that show minor dimensional variations from 
numbers quoted in a Babcock & Wilcox fuel specification. Both sets of values are provided in 
Appendix B for comparison purposes. 
A set of postirradiation calculations attempted to allocate an amount of SNM to each canister 
based on variables such as core position (determines enrichment within an assembly), percentage of fuel 
assembly installed in a canister, quantity of debris (inches of depth), etc. The following details of how 
these values were determined and the assumptions made to account for canister weights and provide the 
distributions of heavy metals are covered in the following discussions. 
There was a basic set of data associated with both tare and shipping weights of the TMI-2 
canisters. To facilitate the following analysis, the canister contents were divided into three classes, as 
follows:
x Recognized fuel assemblies, which were known lengths of more or less intact fuel assemblies. 
Most of these were identifiable so that their initial enrichment (2.96%, 2.64%, or 1.98%) was 
known.
x Structural materials, which was any piece of material with a weight estimate and which contained 
no SNM except perhaps as surface contamination. Structural material included such items as fuel 
assembly end fittings (with no active fuel attached) and spiders. 
x Debris, which was any other core material in the canister. Debris included parts of fuel pins, parts 
of structural material, pieces of resolidified molten material, chips from drilling or cutting 
operations, and other material. 
Reported materials loading of individual canisters came from the Fuel Canister Loading data 
sheets supplied by GPU for the D-type canisters (see Reference 4). These fuel canister loading data sheets 
were the source of the estimated lengths of more or less intact fuel assemblies (2.96%, 2.64%, and 1.98% 
and unknown enrichments). The fuel assembly lengths were obtained by subtracting the canister fill 
depths before and after loading the fuel assembly. The counts of structural components were based on 
notations for the canister loading sheets. 
The total amount of uranium in the TMI-2 core was estimated to be 82,945 kg (see Reference 4). 
An ORIGEN calculation gave predictions of the amounts of each type of SNM in the TMI-2 core.11 These 
values were scaled by a factor of 1.017 in the Lassahn report to make the total uranium inventory agree 
with that given by Lassahn (see Reference 4). The values for total amounts of each type of SNM in the 
TMI-2 reactor were used with the known values of the total fuel assembly lengths for each of the three 
enrichment values. This was done to obtain estimates of the amount of each type of SNM per length of 
fuel assembly for each enrichment. These values from both Lassahn and from Schnitzler were used only 
to estimate mass of SNM per length of fuel assembly. They were not used to estimate the amount of any 
type of material shipped from TMI-2 to the INEEL. The total core inventory values from both Akers and 
from Schnitzler and Briggs are expected to be a little different from the amount shipped. 
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The weights of the fuel assembly structural components are presented in Table 2 (see 
Reference 4). 
A review of the data used in past analyses (criticality concerns at time of canister loading, 
shipment of multiple canisters both across the country and between INEEL facility locations, and 
multicanister dry storage in an NRC-approved facility) relies on GPU-supplied uranium loadings (per 
canister). From shipping data (see Reference 4), the five canisters with the highest reported debris weights 
are shown in Table 3. These data report both a total debris and uranium mass at the time of packaging. 
The reported masses have published “plus/minus” limits applied to each of the canisters, although 
all past criticality analyses (see References 1, 2, and 3) have used the stated weight without any plus or 
minus bias. However, the maximum fissile uranium reported in any package (including the uncertainty 
values for U-235 specific to any specific canister) is less than that shown in Table 4 for an intact assembly 
at 2.96% enrichment. The adoption of the specified new, intact assembly (see Table 4 for total uranium 
and U-235 values) should be considered the most conservative values for criticality modeling (see 
Reference 4).  
The PWR assembly specification (see Appendix A) for the typical 15 u 15 PWR assembly 
stipulates that there is 463.63 kg (1,022.12 lb) of uranium per fuel assembly. This value of uranium mass 
in a typical intact assembly equates to a U-235 mass of 13.72 kg (30.25 lb) at 2.96% enrichment. Neither 
the total uranium mass nor the U-235 mass reported or any TMI-2 canister exceeds those masses in an 
intact, BOL PWR assembly (see Table 3). Any total uranium mass value accounts for the U-238 used in 
criticality calculation in terms of increased parasitic capture. None of the reported total U-235 for  
Table 2. Weights for other fuel assembly components. 
Description
Weight
(lb)
Fuel assembly top end fitting 22.6 + 4.4  
Fuel assembly bottom end fitting 22.6 + 4.4 
Fuel assembly fitting 22.6 + 5.7 
Spider 6.5 + 0.6 
Support post 17.4 + 2.2 
In-core guide tube 6.6 + 0.7 
Table 3. TMI maximum debris massa (by canister ID number). 
Canister ID Number 
Five Highest Debris Masses 
(kg)
Corresponding Uranium Mass 
(kg)
K506 842.18 + 168.3 441.90 + 99.90 
D330 767.35 + 9.07 402.70 + 42.70 
D331 761.00 + 9.07 399.30 + 42.30 
D361 760.09 + 9.07 398.80 + 42.30 
D332 575.37 + 9.07 397.40 + 42.10 
a. Data extracted from Appendix C. 
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Table 4. TMI maximum uranium (both total uranium and U-235) and plutonium mass. 
Canister ID 
Number
Nine Highest 
Uranium
Masses 
(kg)a
Interim Storage 
Uranium Mass 
(kg)b
Nine Highest 
U-235 Masses
(kg)a
Interim Storage 
U-235 Mass 
(kg)b
Total Pu 
(kg)
Corresponding
Debris Mass 
(kg)
K506 441.9 + 99.9c 441.90 9.42 + 2.13d 9.42 0.900 842.18 + 168.3 
D330 402.7 + 42.7c 402.70 8.58 + 0.92 8.58 0.820 767.35 + 9.1 
D283 400.5 + 103c 400.50 7.57 + 1.95 7.57 0.898          0 + 0 
D331 399.3 + 42.3c 399.30 8.51 + 0.91 8.51 0.813 761.00 + 9.1 
D361 398.8 + 42.3c 398.80 8.50 + 0.91 8.50 0.812 760.09 + 9.1
D119 376.5 + 97.3 376.50 10.06 + 2.6d 10.06 0.539          0 + 0 
D260 373.8 + 96.4 373.80 9.66 + 2.42d 9.66 0.571 115.64 + 102.9 
D299 353.9 + 104.0 353.90 9.37 + 2.60d 9.37 0.516          0 + 0 
D193 351.9 + 93.0 351.90 9.41 + 2.49d 9.41 0.504          0 + 0 
New PWR 
assemblye
463.63 — 13.72 — — — 
a. Reported masses at time of shipment from TMI to the INEEL. 
b. Masses reported for TMI-2 canisters transferred to interim, dry storage; these values provide the basis for criticality safety analysis for up to 
12 TMI-2 canisters (per position) in NRC-licensed dry storage.  
c. Five highest uranium masses. 
d. Five highest U-235 masses. 
e. Comparison masses associated with an intact, beginning-of-life fuel loading. 
any of the most highly loaded canisters exceeds the maximum U-235 value based on an assembly with 
BOL 2.96% enrichment (463.55 * 0.0296 = 13.72 kg U-235). The D119 canister with its reported U-235 
loading of 10.06 +2.49 kg U-235 still does not exceed the specification basis; fissile load represents only 
92.3% of a new assembly with 2.96% enrichment. However, the total U-235 reported for K506 still falls 
below the 13.72 kg U-235 for a new assembly because of lower enrichment. Therefore, use of an intact 
15 u 15 Babcock & Wilcox PWR assembly with 2.96% enriched BOL uranium mass values will exceed 
both total uranium and U-235 content used in prior criticality analyses for any of the most highly loaded 
TMI-2 fuel canisters. Representation of the BOL PWR assembly uranium masses within the partitioned 
volume of a TMI “D” canister would represent the highest fissile loading within a canister. 
The internal volume within the fuel canister is a square cross section of 228.60-mm (9.0-in.). The 
internal length of the cavity is 3,465.51 mm (136-7/16 in.). These values result in a total volume of 
181,100.48 cm3 (11,051.4 in.3) in which to distribute the 463.63 kg (1,022.12 lb) of heavy metal within 
the canister. The displaced volume created by the fuel pellets, based on 208 filled rods with 325 pellets 
per rod equals 51,420 cm3 (3,137.28 in.3) or 27.6% of the filled volume. This equates to 72.4% void 
volume within the canister if cladding and structural materials, and canister internals are neglected or 
ignored. Addition of inert materials will only further decrease the available volume for moderator. The 
nature of the core debris as it was loaded into the individual canisters suggests that just the fuel matrix 
pellets without cladding would constitute the bounding maximum reactivity case for a canister fuel load. 
Furthermore, a comparison of uranium masses reported in the TMI canisters versus those of an intact 
PWR assembly buttresses the argument of a bounding case analysis using a single PWR assembly. 
While Boral¥ was installed as an integral portion of the box liner for the fuel canister (see 
Reference 10), no credit will be taken for its presence. None of the other degraded, inert materials that 
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may be present in the canister (zirconium or its oxides, stainless steel or its components) will be used to 
provide any credit for either poisoning effects or moderator displacement within the fuel compartment.
The fuel canister was specifically designed to hold either complete or partial fuel assemblies. The 
chord regions between the box liner and the canister inner wall were filled with the low density concrete 
mixture consisting of 60% Alcoa CA-25C refractory cement, 11% glass microspheres, and 29% water by 
weight. This mixture was intended to create a solid filler with an approximate density of 1.0 g/cm3. Atom 
number density values used in the criticality analysis for this grout mix are shown in Table A-6.12
In a nonbreeder reactor, historical experience indicates that there will not be as much of an 
increase in plutonium concentrations as there is a decrease in U-235.13 Fissile plutonium quantities can be 
offset by corresponding decreases in U-235 mass; the plutonium would be modeled as a fissile species 
with its own atom-density representative of the particular fissile isotope concentration. There may be 
some standard ratio of Pu-239 and Pu-241 that can be apportioned given a combined accounting of the 
two isotopes produced in a commercial reactor. 
The disrupted fuel started in the new assemblies as UO2. Damage to the core as a result of the 
accident led to exposure of the fuel matrix to both high temperatures and potentially oxidizing conditions. 
Formation of an oxide species other than the UO2 in the fuel matrix may be of scientific interest. 
However, presence of UO3 or U3O8 (or other oxide forms of uranium) should have no significant 
consequence to the overall criticality calculation if the uranium atom-density is modeled correctly based 
on the uranium oxide density in the fuel pellet. The zirconium cladding may have undergone similar 
oxidation. But its presence in creating a model within the TMI-2 canister would be neutral in terms of 
contributing to criticality analysis and can, therefore, be ignored in the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) 
models. Any net effect for oxide forms of either material (zirconium or uranium) would be in their 
expansion, decreased atom-density, and moderator displacement. 
There are predominant differences in modeling assumptions because of the different conditions 
expected in storage and transportation versus those expected in repository disposal. Some of those 
differences include: 
x Waste package void flooding with full-density water (repository conditions) rather than partial fill 
with full-density in monitored environment (storage conditions) 
x Model development to analyze for maximum reactivity in a single canister (repository conditions) 
rather than maximum reactivity based on maximum fuel loading in a multicanister array (storage 
conditions)
x Analysis of packages without poison due to prescribed solubility of boron in any package 
(repository conditions) versus calculations based on 75% retention of boron in a package in a 
controlled environment (storage conditions for finite time period.). 
3.3.1 Core Burnup 
Reported value for the average core burnup may vary slightly from source to source. One 
reported value with supporting documentation provided an average 3,175 MWD/MTU.14 This burnup 
represents ~10% of the typical burnup experienced by a standard PWR assembly. As such, the average 
heat generation expected of any TMI canister will be ~20 watts (see Reference 10). The following core 
maps (Figures 4 through 11) showing enrichment and calculated burnup by position (see Reference 11). 
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Figure 4. TMI-2 element location and enrichment map. 
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Figure 9. TMI-2 burnup for axial Level 5 of 7. 
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Figure 10. TMI-2 burnup for axial Level 6 of 7. 
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Figure 11. TMI-2 burnup for axial Level 7 of 7. 
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3.3.2 Radionuclide Inventory 
Radionuclide inventories for this commercial fuel inventory are significantly less than for 
standard, fully burned commercial fuels due to the limited time the fuel was in service before the reactor 
experienced a partial meltdown. 
The information presented in Table D-1 represents two radionuclide values associated with the 
D-153 canister. Values for other canisters can be scaled from these values by the ratio of the heavy metal 
masses between canisters. These reported values are from template values calculated and assigned to 
certain TMI-2 canisters. The nominal burnup values are reported based on the calculated heavy metal 
mass destroyed. Bounding values are merely assumed to be twice the nominal values, whether as burnup, 
radionuclide curie inventory, or heat output. 
3.3.2.1 Heat Output. On a per canister basis, the nominal thermal power for the D-153 canister is 
shown in Table D-1 as 2.0 watts per canister (nominal) and 3.99 watts (bounding). Scaleup using the 
same burnup percentage applied to an otherwise intact PWR assembly would use a multiplier of 
(463.63 kg U * 
Ukg08.19
W0.2  = 48.60 W. 
This canister is considered to be representative of the 341 canisters in storage. 
3.3.2.2 Shielding Source Term. Gamma source information can be extracted from Table D-1 as a 
bounding case value. The same multiplier shown above can be used to adjust individual radionuclide 
curie values.
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4. DOE STANDARD FUEL CANISTER INFORMATION 
A standard canister design for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has 
been adopted to facilitate uniformity in terms of: handling at the repository, packaging the canister within 
the waste package, analyses (thermal, shielding, criticality), and qualification of a minimal number of 
designs. Details of this canister design can be found in a design specification published by the National 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Program.15
4.1 SNF Canister Characteristics 
The standard SNF canister design is intended to provide fuel containment with a standard size for 
predictability for handling and loading operations within a waste package. SNF canister internals are 
varied internally with baskets to facilitate loading operations, and predictability of fuel positions for intact 
criticality analysis. 
4.1.1 Dimensions 
Overall length of the standard canister to be used for the three fuel types studied in this analysis is 
4,569 mm (15 ft nominal). Available internal length shrinks to approximately 4,114.8 mm (13.5 ft) to 
accommodate the internal impact plate, the head closure, and the standoff ring (for impact absorption). 
Figure 12 depicts the DOE SNF standard canister.  
4.1.2 Mass 
Each component in a standard canister has an associated weight, dependent on the diameter and 
length. A summary of these weights follows in Table 5. 
While the total weight of the heavy metals in each canister is important to the criticality analysis, 
it is the total weight of each TMI-2 canister that determines the combined allowable weight for each 
standard canister. 
4.1.3 Materials of Construction 
SNF canister materials are standardized around 300 series stainless steel with the exception of 
both the carbon steel impact plate and TMI-2 canister guide tube inside the standard canister. Figure 13 is 
a proposed layout of the sleeve inside the SNF canister used to position the TMI-2 canisters. 
4.1.3.1 316L Stainless Steel. The stainless steel outer shell will use 316L stainless steel material; 
composition is as shown in Table A-1.
4.1.3.2 Carbon Steel (Internal Impact Plates). The curved, carbon steel impact plates fit inside 
each end of the canister, and vary from 15.24 mm (0.60 in.) to 50.8 mm (2.0 in.) in thickness. The 
chemical composition of these plates is shown in Table A-4.
4.1.4 Basket Internals 
Conceptual basket internals for the canister would be intended as nothing more than a centering 
device for the TMI canister installation. Such a basket could take the form of a pipe sleeve, some form of 
positioning brackets, or be nothing more than expanded metal mesh. In each case, some form of standoff 
from the inner wall of the standard canister is designed to maintain a centered position of the sleeve. A 
sleeve constructed of pipe material (16-in. Schedule 10 carbon steel) would be the approach creating the 
maximum reflection. Such a configuration would necessarily create a 19.05-mm (3/4-in.) gap between the 
TMI canister and the sleeve. There would also be a corresponding 15.88-mm (5/8-in.) gap between the 
sleeve and the inside of the standard canister. 
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Figure 12. SNF standard canister. 
Table 5. Empty spent nuclear fuel canister weights. 
Length Canister Body Impact Plate Sleeve 
Total Canister 
Weight
Maximum Total 
Allowable Weight 
10 ft 728 lb  
(330.1 kg) 
182 lb  
(82.5 kg) 
281 lb  
(127.4 kg) 
1,191 lb  
(540.1 kg) 
5,005 lb  
(2,270 kg) 
15 ft 1,073 lb  
(486.6 kg) 
182 lb  
(82.5 kg) 
455 lb  
(206.3 kg) 
1,710 lb  
(775.5 kg) 
6,000 lb  
(2,721 kg) 
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Figure 13. Conceptual cross-section sketch of TMI canister in standard SNF canister. (This drawing is not 
to scale.) 
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5. WASTE PACKAGE DESIGN 
A standard waste package design to contain the DOE SNF canister has been adopted to facilitate 
uniformity in terms of: handling at the repository, packaging the canister for codisposal, analyses 
(thermal, shielding, criticality), and qualification of a minimal number of designs. 
5.1 Codisposal Concept 
The codisposal waste package is designed to accommodate five high-level waste (HLW) canisters 
surrounding a single SNF canister in the center position. Dimensions vary only in the length of the 
package needed to accommodate either the 10 or 15-ft HLW/DOE SNF canisters. Figure 14 depicts the 
cross-section view of the waste package and its internals.16
5.1.1 Waste Package Shell 
The outside diameter of the waste package is 2,030 mm (79.92 in.), and the inside cavity length is 
4,618 mm (181.8 in.), which is designed to accommodate Hanford 15-ft HLW glass canisters. The lids of 
the inner barrier are 105 mm (4.134 in.) thick; those of the outer barrier are 25 mm (0.984 in.) thick. 
There is a 30-mm (1.181-in.) gap between the inner and outer barrier upper lids. Each end of the waste 
package has a 225-mm-long (8.858-in.) skirt.  
Figure 14. Cross-sectional view of typical codisposal waste package (see Reference 16). 
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The DOE SNF canister is placed in a 31.75-mm (1.250-in.)-thick support tube with a nominal 
outer diameter of 565 mm (22.244 in.). The support tube is connected to the inside wall of the waste 
package by a web-like structure of basket plates to support five long HLW glass canisters. The support 
tube and the plates are 4,607 mm (181.378 in.) long (see Reference 16). 
5.1.2 Materials of Construction 
The barrier materials of the waste package are typical of those used for commercial SNF waste 
packages. The inner barrier is composed of 50-mm (1.969-in.)-thick Type 316 NG stainless steel. The 
outer barrier comprises 25 mm (0.984 in.) of high-nickel alloy ASTM B 575 (Alloy 22). The SNF 
canister support tube and basket plates are constructed of carbon steel (ASTM A 516 Grade 70). A 
summary of pertinent dimensions and material specifications is provided in Table 6. 
Table 6. Codisposal waste package dimensions and material specifications (see Reference 16). 
Component Material Parameter 
Dimension 
(mm) 
Thickness 25 Outer barrier shell ASTM B 575 (Alloy 22) 
Outer diameter 2,030 
Thickness 50 Inner barrier shell SS 316 NG 
Inner length 4,618 
Extended outer shell lid ASTM B 575 (Alloy 22) Thickness 25 
Outer shell flat closure lid ASTM B 575 (Alloy 22) Thickness 10 
Inner shell lid SS 316 NG Thickness 105 
Closure lid to extended outer lid gap Air Thickness 30 
Inner shell lid to closure lid gap Air Thickness 30 
Outer diameter 565 
Inner diameter 501.5 
Support tube ASTM A 516 Grade 70 
Length 4,607 
Thickness 25.4 Inner bracket ASTM A 516 Grade 70 
Length 4,607 
Thickness 12.7 Outer bracket ASTM A 516 Garde 70 
Length 4,607 
5.2 Borosilicate Glass 
5.2.1 HLW Glass Canister 
There is no 15-ft-long Savannah River Site HLW glass canister. Therefore, the expected Hanford 
15-ft HLW glass canister is used as found in the Fort St. Vrain waste package analysis (see Reference 16). 
The Hanford 15-ft HLW glass canister is a 4,572-mm (180-in.)-long stainless steel Type 304L canister 
with an outer diameter of 610 mm (24 in.).17 The wall thickness is 10.5 mm (0.4,134 in.). These 
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parameters are the same as the Savannah River Site canister, except that it is longer. The maximum 
loaded canister weight is 4,200 kg, and the fill volume is 87%. 
5.2.2 HLW Glass Composition 
The borosilicate glass intended for the Hanford canister has yet to be precisely specified in terms 
of composition, waste loading, physical properties, etc. However, given similar characteristics of the 
waste produced in the fuel dissolution and neutralization before tank farm storage, the resulting glass 
composition should be similar to that produced at Savannah River; see Appendix A for both chemical and 
radioisotope composition. While these compositions may not reflect the actual glass compositions 
ultimately produced by Hanford, they provide a basis for criticality evaluations for prebreach conditions. 
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6. DEGRADATION SCENARIOS 
There are several engineered components within each waste package and also within the SNF 
canisters. Each of the components is expected to fail either sequentially or in conjunction with other 
components. Some components provide a barrier against moderator introduction to the package. Other 
components provide some degree of moderator exclusion (both intact and degraded).  
Design of any of the TMI canisters and criticality analyses done at the time of loading and any 
prior transports took credit for canister internals and installed poisons (boron carbide). For purposes of 
comparison to past analyses, internal structures will be left in the initial model for baseline comparison. 
This planned analysis will examine various conditions that might be expected during degradation. Any 
further analysis will include removal or repositioning of materials within each style of canister in order to 
identify the most reactive configurations. Such removal of materials in the analysis reflects the more 
conservative approach toward disallowing credit of installed components for which condition or presence 
cannot be verified. However, failure scenarios do take credit for corrosion products in any degradation 
cases where solubilities of the degradation products suggest their retention, e.g., goethite formed from 
iron corrosion. 
6.1 Waste Package Degradation 
The waste package has been designed for durability and for preventing the introduction of water 
into the waste package. Until water actually enters the waste package, criticality remains a nonissue for 
any of the DOE fuels. However, water intrusion into any waste package effectively adds moderation 
around and potentially into the DOE SNF canister. 
Each component within any waste package has a finite longevity upon the introduction of water. 
Because of nesting of these components and barriers within one another, the failures leading to the 
introduction of water immediately adjacent to the fuel matrix tend to be sequential. However, only a top 
breach of the waste package can realistically promote failure of other waste package components via a 
constant immersion of those components. Under these conditions of immersion in accumulated water, 
expected failures of components within the waste package are expected to occur from the bottom up. 
Such sequential failures may preclude certain configurations from forming. Scenario descriptions 
associated with any criticality analysis take no credit for any such limitation. The emphasis of any 
criticality analysis will be to model the most reactive configuration with respect to internal moderation 
and reflective boundaries. 
6.1.1 Outer Shell 
The outer shell of the waste package uses an Alloy 22 material as a primary barrier against a 
water-induced breach of the waste package itself. Water dripping onto the waste package at other than 
very specific widths along the top surfaces should not promote a waste package breach. Specific locations 
that might eventually hold water could promote collection/concentration of electrolytes in the ground 
water for a top-breach of the waste package. 
6.1.2 Inner Shell 
The inner shell is constructed of 316NG material. Its application as part of the barrier against 
water intrusion into the waste package potentially works against promotion of criticality safety, because it 
provides a barrier that promotes water retention if breached from the top.  
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6.1.3 Waste Package Canister Lattice 
The internal lattice is constructed of A516 Grade 70 carbon steel. As a material less resistant to 
corrosion than the other stainless steel components, it offers a preferential failure mode through an 
expected galvanic corrosion coupling within a breached waste package. Long-term corrosion of this 
material is expected to produce either iron oxides or goethite [FeO(OH)]. In the horizontal orientation, 
there is an expectation of some settling of the individual canisters, one on another, that will close the 
designed tolerances between components. This closure of distance between individual, intact canisters is 
discounted in any model because there are more reactive configurations to evaluate. 
6.1.4 HLW Canister (304L) 
HLW packages higher in the waste package may experience intermittent drips, but general 
corrosion of the submerged HLW canisters is expected to occur from a rising water level within a 
top-breached waste package.  
6.1.4.1 Borosilicate Glass. Prior analyses have, upon degradation of the borosilicate glass, used a 
clay-like material in place of the glass. While certain materials may leach from the glass and other 
chemical compounds may form, formation of the clayey material permits an assumed redistribution of 
these chemicals throughout the waste package. The clay forms a viso-elastic material with flow properties 
that either fills in interstitial spaces or allows heavier materials to settle through the clay.
The clay can exhibit several properties conducive to promoting decreasing system reactivity, 
depending on the conditions of the clay (degree of water saturation) and its location (as a reflector 
surrounding the fissile material or as moderating material when mixed with the fissile material). 
6.1.5 SNF Canister (316L) 
The SNF canister will be surrounded by the carbon steel centering sleeve within the waste 
package. Goethite expected to form around the SNF canister may delay the breach of the SNF canister. 
Expectation of the SNF canister breach would be from underneath because of early immersion and 
galvanic corrosion coupling with the centering sleeve. The ability to fully immerse the TMI canister 
would also be from below. Eventually, degraded components of the SNF canister shell would convert to 
goethite.
6.1.5.1 SNF Canister Sleeve. The internal SNF canister sleeve would use carbon steel. Whether a 
top or bottom breach of the SNF canister occurred, goethite formation is expected from the sleeve based 
on a corrosion breach/water ingress into the SNF canister and prior to actual failure of the TMI canister. 
On a conceptual basis, the centering sleeve would consist of a 16-in. Schedule 10 pipe (0.250-in. wall 
thickness) with standoffs inside the SNF canister. There are no implied geometry controls created by the 
sleeve; its installation provides a centering function and minimizes rattle room inside the SNF canister. 
Upon degradation, the sleeve would convert to a goethite layer between two 300 series stainless steel 
layers of the SNF canister and the TMI-2 canister.
6.1.5.2 TMI Knockout Canister (304L SS). The knockout canister contains a distinctive set of 
internals that were designed to: (1) facilitate disengagement and retention of core debris material that was 
hydro-vacuumed from the core and (2) maintain a degree of neutron poisoning with boron carbide 
installed.
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Information for the K-506 canister fissile loading, and by neglecting the knockout canister 
intervals, provides the largest free volume for water fill, highest fissile mass, and opportunity for 
optimum moderation.  
6.1.5.2.1 Installed Structure (300 series SST)—The internal structure of the knockout 
canister may provide a number of features associated with enforcement of criticality safety at the time of 
loading and for interim storage. On the relatively short-term basis, up to and including recent transport 
and current storage in a dry storage facility at INTEC, credit for the presence of the internal basket 
structure might be taken.
On a longer-term basis that ultimately includes a breach of the TMI canister, credit for the 
structure would be disallowed. Given the unknown condition of the TMI core debris, a simplifying 
assumption would distribute the fissile mass as fuel pellets uniformly throughout the debris mixture inside 
the knockout canister. With a projected degradation of the knockout canister internals, there is the 
possibility of a radial redistribution of fuel pellets. 
6.1.5.2.2 Installed Poisons—Boron carbide was installed specifically in both the fuel 
canisters and the knockout canisters in various shapes and forms. While perhaps practical to take credit 
for such poisons during the short-term storage of materials and known integrity of the TMI canister, the 
long-term disposal environment precludes any ability to take credit for the presence of any boron 
compound in the system due to boron solubility.
Within each knockout canister, there is a tube and plate support structure that provides 
displacement of both core debris with included fuel pellets and moderator in the case of a breached TMI 
canister. Because of the postclosure conditions mandated for any DOE SNF canister, credit for engineered 
structures inside any canister must be discounted. 
6.1.5.2.3 Core Debris—Vacuumed TMI core fuel consists of a mixture of fuel pellets and 
other inert debris (metal and metal oxides) from damaged fuel assemblies. There is significant uncertainty 
relative to the mix or portions of inerts to fuel mass, other than a reported total debris mass, a total 
uranium mass, and a U-235 mass. Furthermore, any fissile material must assume optimum distribution 
within a canister.
6.1.5.3 TMI Fuel Canister. The design of the fuel canister provides the greatest constraint of fuel 
pellet movements. The box construction for each assembly and the associated LiCon¥ prevents pellet 
movement in any radial or outward expansion. Pellet pitch spacing for a fuel assembly within the confines 
of the fuel canister sleeve would be less than that found in a knockout canister. This suboptimal spacing 
has been shown (see Reference 20) to be less reactive. Materials in the concrete (calcium and silicon) 
promote water displacement from a reflective position. Furthermore, upon degradation and formation of a 
clay-like material that could mix in with the pellets, further water displacement is expected. Pellets within 
damaged fuel assemblies are not expected to expand or redistribute as with the knockout canisters 
because even the damaged fuel rods and the longevity of the zirconium cladding provide a degree of 
constraint against pellet movement. However, the knockout canister (fissile loading, free volume) bounds 
the fuel canister in any case.
6.1.5.4 TMI Filter Canister. While the filter canisters also have a large free volume similar to the 
knockout canister after degradation of the internals, the listed fissile loading is dwarfed and, therefore, 
bounded by any of the knockout canisters.
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6.2 Degradation of Waste Package Internals 
Debris in the fuel canister consists of fuel core materials ranging in shape and mass from nearly 
intact fuel assemblies (fuel canisters) to loose materials subject to hydro-vacuuming (knockout canisters). 
The materials contained within each waste package vary as to the degree the integrity of fuel pellet 
containment is still provided by the zirconium tubing. Historical experience reports that systems with 
fissile enrichments <5% are best modeled as heterogeneous rather than homogeneous systems.18,19
The most significant issue related to criticality modeling for these canisters revolves around 
assumptions made relative to fuel pellet orientation within each canister. In the case of the fuel canisters, 
nearly intact fuel assemblies provide some degree of containment by virtue of fuel pins that maintain fuel 
pellet orientation. The knockout canister provides a unique set of circumstances, where individual pellets 
were loaded and mixed into the same canister with other debris from the damaged reactor core. Neither 
the orientation of the pellets or their relative spacing in the debris mix inside the knockout canisters is 
well defined. 
The total mass and heavy metal masses (uranium and plutonium) are reported for these canisters, 
yet even those reported values have stated uncertainties and ranges of values. Without some degree of 
verification (radiography, gamma scan, etc.), certain assumptions are needed to support the material 
distribution with a given TMI canister when establishing the parameters used in any criticality model. 
Previous criticality analysis20 has shown that the most reactive condition to be examined would rely on a 
uniform distribution of fuel particles throughout the internal volume of the knockout canister. 
6.2.1 Water Ingress to Waste Package 
Water ingress into the waste package through a top breach is capable of creating both wetted 
surfaces as well as a ponding or bathtub accumulation of water in the bottom of the package. For the 
wetted surface condition, galvanic corrosion couples and localized corrosion can promote breaching of 
the HLW or SNF canister walls, but would not contribute significantly to quantitative water additions to 
the canister internals. 
6.2.2 Waste Package Spacer Degradation 
The carbon steel spacer (or centering sleeve) used to facilitate loading of the waste package is the 
component inside the waste package most susceptible to general corrosion and loss of form. Corrosion 
byproducts for this degradation may form iron oxides or goethite. As a relatively insoluble material, the 
goethite would provide a superficial layer around the outside of the SNF canister as it expands during 
corrosion. The corrosion behavior of the carbon steel sleeve is that it will degrade faster than the stainless 
steel of the TMI-2 canister once exposed to water.
6.2.2.1 Stainless Steel Degradation. The HLW canister degradation is the second component 
expected to undergo corrosion. For the horizontal waste package orientation, the bottom HLW canisters 
would be the first to be submerged. The uppermost canisters, including the SNF canister, inside the waste 
package are expected to fail over a longer period of time. Generally, a delayed failure of these upper 
canisters would allow them to settle in an intact condition into the previously degraded components. The 
molybdenum and chromium form molybdic and chromic acids out of the 300 series stainless steel 
degradation. The nickel forms nickel oxide (NiO), and the iron decomposes to goethite [FeO(OH)]. From 
any standpoint that promotes the most reactive configuration, analysis should examine the uniform 
distribution of these degradation materials.21
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6.2.2.2 Clay Formation. Clay formation is a natural outgrowth of the HLW degradation. Boron, 
sodium, and potassium are the major components with high solubility and are, therefore, expected to 
transport from the canister/waste package; this would leave the calcium, aluminum, iron, and silicon as 
the major constituents of the clay.
6.3 SNF Canister Degradation 
Installation of an otherwise intact TMI-2 canister inside a standardized SNF canister merely 
provides an already qualified size canister for installation in the waste package. 
6.3.1 SNF Canister Degradation 
The TMI-2 canisters installed in each standard SNF canister represent one additional barrier to 
water intrusion and access to any fuel material. The stainless steel construction of the SNF canister and its 
positioning in the center of the waste package are expected to delay breaching due to delayed exposure to 
water. Such a delay is predicated on an ability to accumulate water inside the waste package but with no 
direct water contact with the waste package until the water level inside the breached waste package 
approaches package centerline. Furthermore, SNF canister breach is expected at the bottom of the SNF 
canister where first water contact and galvanic corrosion coupling occurs between carbon steel and 
stainless steel due to the orientation of the canisters. 
6.3.2 Carbon Steel Sleeve Degradation 
Centering sleeve degradation (inside the standard SNF canister) would follow the same 
degradation path and result in the same components expected from the carbon steel degradation 
associated with the waste package basket structure. 
The center sleeve is an open-ended tube that acts as a positioning or centering device to minimize 
the rattle room of any TMI canisters. When flooded, it will be subject to corrosion on all surfaces. The 
carbon steel sleeve material upon degradation forms goethite that under unconfined conditions provides 
merely decreased reflection. 
6.3.3 TMI Canister Degradation 
The stainless steel TMI canister may already have experienced some localized, external corrosion 
while in wet storage for the approximately 15 years prior to transfer to dry storage. The early storage 
environment may lead to an otherwise premature failure once exposed to another water immersion 
occurring inside a failed waste package. Such a premature failure would likely promote preferential 
introduction of water rather than degradation products from HLW canister degradation. 
Any breach of the TMI-2 canister would be subsequent to the degradation of the sleeve and 
standoff brackets or spacers. In a horizontal package orientation, such degradation would allow the TMI-2 
canister to settle to the inside surface of the canister. This would result in a reflective layer of both the 
goethite formed from the sleeve and the 316 stainless steel layer of the standard SNF canister. 
6.3.3.1 Fuel Canister Internals. The fuel canister, as designated with a “D” prefix on the canister 
callout, consists of stainless steel sleeve to create a void space within the canister that is capable of 
accommodating a single PWR assembly. The interstitial space between the box and the internal side-walls 
of the canister were filled with a cementatious material with a trade name of LiCon¥. The LiCon¥
composition and quantity is expected to have a negligible effect on the chemistry relative to the heavy 
metal and debris inside the internal sleeve. If the LiCon¥ were to promote any solubility of the TMI 
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heavy metal debris, its contribution would only serve to make the system less reactive by further 
homogenizing the debris.
The square liner inside the fuel canister provides a definable boundary within which to distribute 
a designated number of fuel pellets. The liner, the LiCon¥, and the TMI canister shell compose a set of 
reflective boundaries for purposes of modeling in the criticality analysis. 
The quantity of damaged assembly / debris materials is constrained by the space available inside 
the sleeve. Neither the physical mass nor the reported heavy metal mass in any fuel canister exceeds the 
specified weight of an intact PWR fuel assembly for the TMI reactor (reference Appendix C). The 
constraints provided by the surrounding materials prevent redistribution of any fuel pellets to a more 
optimal pitch or the addition of significant moderation toward a more optimally moderated system. Intact, 
the LiCon¥ and liner prevent expansion of any pellet array, and their degradation would promote 
collapse.
6.3.3.2 Knockout Canister Internal Structures. The design of the knockout canister provides 
the largest free volume coupled with one of the highest reported debris/heavy metal loadings (441.9 kg U, 
9.42 kg U-235, 842.18 kg debris; see Table 4). The structural materials inserted into the knockout 
canisters are constructed of a combination of 304 and 316 series stainless steels. Boron carbide in a pellet 
form was installed inside each of the five poisoned rods (see Figure 3) used to maintain support plate 
spacing.
Over time, neither the structural integrity of the rods/support plates nor the continued presence of 
the boron carbide can be ensured. Furthermore, the nature or condition of any inert debris inside the 
canister cannot be given any credit for purposes of moderator displacement because its location and 
quantity cannot be verified. The most conservative approach would be to assume knockout canister 
without any internals or poisons and a full complement of fuel pellets (67,600) found in a single, intact 
assembly. Such an assumption results in a fissile mass that is approximately 45% in excess of the 
maximum reported knockout (K506) canister loading. 
Typical criticality analyses conducted with highly enriched systems have relied on a 
homogeneous distribution of fissile materials inside their respective SNF canisters. For the case of 
low-enriched (<5% U-235) systems, typical models rely on discrete or heterogeneous distribution of the 
fissile material (see References 18 and 19). Within a knockout canister, such an analysis will rely on a 
distribution of 67,600 fuel pellets within the free volume (between the lower support plate and the upper 
closure lid). Furthermore, the fuel pellets are assumed to be uniformly distributed throughout the debris at 
the time of loading. The follow on assumption is that they will continue to be uniformly distributed 
throughout the canister in spite of the disappearance of any debris, structural material, or boron carbide. 
6.3.3.3 Filter Canister Internals. The structural internals associated with the filter canisters differ 
from either the debris or knockout canisters. However, the physical free volume is considered comparable 
to that of the knockout canister. The major distinction between the knockout and filter canisters is the 
reported fissile loads. The most highly loaded of the filter canisters (F471 with 4.59 kg U-235) represents 
approximately 33% of a complete fuel assembly’s worth of pellets. Furthermore, the nature of the solids 
collected in the knockout canister provides a more homogeneous mixture (fines and small particulate) that 
would be less conducive to promotion of a system with maximum reactivity. To the extent that both the 
filter and knockout canisters have similar free volumes, both the nature and quantity of the solids in the 
knockout would provide the bounding case analysis for any degradation scenario.
DOE/SNF/REP-084  September 2003 
Revision 0  Page 53 of 57 
6.4 Order-of-Failure Scenarios 
There will necessarily be an ordered sequence of events that could ultimately lead to water 
ingress into the TMI-2 canisters. This order is prescribed by the nature of the other barriers and may be 
influenced by the time-dependent corrosion of these various barriers. Both sequential and concurrent 
events contribute to eventual moderator ingress to the SNF canister. 
6.4.1 Waste Package Failures 
Failure or breach of a waste package may occur for a number of events, but only a drip from 
above onto the centerline of the waste package provides a credible means of accumulating a significant 
amount of water in a waste package. The degree of degradation will be a function of the ability to collect 
and retain water. Ultimately, the most reactive configuration conceivable needs to account for the failure 
mechanisms of the various barriers. The analysis must necessarily allow for retention of materials 
associated either with reflection or moderator in their respective, optimal location within a waste package. 
Various conditions will be analyzed to identify the most reactive system configuration. 
While various failure scenarios can be depicted for waste package failure and a subsequent 
release, only a top-drip on the waste package centerline provides a mechanism to breach and promote 
water accumulation inside the package. Any other breach mechanism does not promote water ingress and 
retention inside the waste package. 
6.4.2 HLW Canister Failure 
For any water accumulation inside the waste package, there will be various degrees of corrosion 
based on the rate of water introduction. There is an expected, generalized corrosion of the carbon steel 
insert that separates the SNF and HLW canisters. Generalized corrosion of the lower HLW canister shell 
will occur concurrent with the carbon steel insert. Degradation of the lower HLW canisters is expected to 
occur incrementally as water level rises inside the breached waste package.  
6.4.3 SNF Canister Failure 
The SNF canister corrosion should be delayed due to its elevated position within the waste 
package. The position of any corrosion induced breach of the SNF canister now becomes important 
because it impacts the potential for formation of a more or less reactive SNF canister configuration. 
Ultimately, sequential failures of the SNF canister and any TMI-2 canister result in a combination of clay 
in either a reflective layer (outside the TMI-2 canister) or moderating location (inside the TMI-2 canister). 
Water may also be found in either a reflective or moderating position. 
Water internal to the SNF canister (located approximately mid-point of the horizontal axis of the 
waste package) will promote corrosion on the inner surface of the SNF canister, inside and outside 
surfaces of the centering sleeve, and the outer surface of the TMI canister. 
There is a predictable sequence of breaching to the various components, starting with the top 
breach of the waste package. Subsequent breaches of barriers within the waste package will experience 
bottom-to-top, generalized corrosion as water accumulates inside the waste package. The rate and 
sequential corrosion of various components is very dependent on the rate of accumulation for water 
entering the breached waste package. The bottom-to-top corrosion would tend to promote filling canisters 
within the waste package from bottom to top. Such flow direction is expected to be somewhat limiting in 
terms of flowing clay-like material from any HLW degradation into the SNF canister. Furthermore, at 
least in the TMI canister disposal scheme, there is not only the required breach of the SNF canister, but 
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also the TMI canister internal to the SNF canister to get water to moderate the fuel debris. Any breach of 
each additional barrier creates only a more convoluted path for any material transport other than water, 
whether entering or exiting the TMI canister. 
6.4.4 TMI Canister Failure 
The TMI canister will be resting on the inside curvature of the centering sleeve. The centering 
sleeve would be positioned inside the SNF canister with some form of standoff (assuming they had not 
corroded). Water is expected to be the sole moderator of influence (see Reference 20) (rather than 
hydrated clayey material). Any clayey material will have little if any fissile material, because any heavy 
metal presence is derived from trace quantities of slightly enriched natural uranium (1.15% maximum 
expected in Hanford glass) in the waste stream used for glass production. 
The fuel debris inside the TMI canister is assumed to be uniformly distributed throughout the 
inside of the canister as cylindrical pellets the size of the original pellets in the PWR assembly. Criticality 
analysis will use the uniform distribution of fuel pellets as a starting point with varying pitch and spacing 
of the pellets to identify “most reactive” configurations. Intrusion of water into the void space inside the 
TMI canister would provide a fully flooded environment. Neither the zirconium metal or oxide from the 
cladding, nor the uranium oxide pellets are considered to be soluble; so, transport or movement of these 
materials outside the confines of the TMI canister in solution form can be ignored. Furthermore, the 
heterogeneous nature of low-enriched systems (<5%) is generally acknowledged to be more reactive than 
an equivalent mass of fissile material in a homogeneous system. 
Given the combination of barriers and boundaries created by nesting one canister inside another 
canister within a waste package, there is a multitude of combinations and permutations of degraded 
conditions to examine. The key to any such analysis would be to identify the most reactive system 
configuration. 
The most seriously degraded mode anticipated for the TMI canister should examine a water-filled 
TMI canister surrounded by prebreach clay from HLW decomposition. Experience in a criticality scoping 
analysis (see Reference 18) with TMI-2 canisters revealed two significant findings. Addition of a 
nonmoderator, such as clay to the fuel pellet zone, displaces the moderator and, thereby, reduces system 
reactivity. Conversely, addition of water to a reflective layer, e.g. clay around the fuel pellet zone, appears 
to decrease the system reactivity, although not as dramatically as the prior condition. 
Additional calculations could include comparisons on the basis of: 
x Added plutonium (EOL) values 
x Spherical rather than cylindrical pellets 
x Moderator displacement based on inert content assumptions. 
A comparative loading of both hypothetical and reported values for fissile materials and heavy 
metals is presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Comparative fissile loadings for canisters and assemblies. 
Total U/assembly, kg: 463.63     
Total U/core, kg: 82,039.5     
Pellets/assembly 67,600     
Fuel Assembly 
Number of 
Assemblies Enrichment
Fissile
per Assembly
(kg)
Total
Fissile, (kg)
Total U 
(kg)
Type I 57 1.98 9.1799 523.253 26,426.91  
Type II 60 2.64 12.2398 734.390 27,817.80  
Type III 60 2.96 13.7234 823.407 27,817.80  
Reactor totals    2,081.050 82,062.51  
Quantities for modeling:       
Type
%
Enrichment
U-235
(kg)
Pu-239
(kg) Basis 
 High enrich + 
EOL Pu 
— 13.72 1.0  (Calculated) 
 Criticality 
model 
3.00 13.90 —  (Bounding 
assumption) 
Intact
assembly 
High enrich 2.96 13.72 —  (Specification)
Canister D119 2.67 10.06 0.506  (Reported) 
Canister D193 2.67 9.41 0.473  (Reported) 
Canister D299 2.65 9.37 0.485  (Reported) 
Intact
assembly 
Med. enrich 2.64 12.24 —  (Specification)
Canister D260 2.58 9.66 0.537  (Reported) 
Whole core Avg. enrich 2.54 11.77 —  (Calculated) 
Center core Avg. enrich 2.32 10.75 —  (Calculated) 
Canister K506 2.13 9.42 0.845  (Reported) 
Intact
assembly 
Low enrich 1.98 9.18 —  (Specification)
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Appendix A 
Materials and Compositions 
316L Stainless Steel—The stainless steel inner shell of the waste package will use 316L stainless 
steel material; composition is as shown in Table A-1.A-1
Table A-1. Chemical composition of stainless steel Type 316L. 
Element 
Composition 
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 1.2003E-04
Manganese (Mn) 2.00 (max.) 2.00 1.7494E-03
Phosphorus (P) 0.045(max.) 0.045 6.9817E-05
Sulfur (S) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 4.5091E-05
Silicon (Si) 1.00 (max.) 1.0 1.7110E-03
Chromium (Cr) 16.00–18.00 17.00 1.5712E-02
Nickel (Ni) 10.00–14.00 12.00 9.8251E-03
Molybdenum (Mo) 2.00–3.00 2.50 1.2522E-03
Nitrogen (N) 0.10 (max.) 0.10 3.4318E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 65.295 5.6187E-02
Source: ASTM A 276-91a, p.2 (UNS S31603) 
Density = 7.98 g/cm3
304L stainless steel—The material used in the construction of the typical HLW glass canister 
(see Reference A-1). 
Table A-2. Chemical composition of stainless steel Type 304L. 
Element 
Composition 
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 1.1943E-04
Manganese (Mn) 2.00 (max.) 2.00 1.7407E-03
Phosphorus (P) 0.045 (max.) 0.045 6.9467E-05
Sulfur (S) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 4.4865E-05
Silicon (Si) 0.75 (max.) 0.75 1.2769E-03
Chromium (Cr) 18.00–20.00 19.00 1.7472E-02
Nickel (Ni) 8.00–12.00 10.00 8.1465E-03
Nitrogen (N) 0.1 0.10 3.4146E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 68.045 5.8260E-02
Source: ASTM A 240/a 240M-97a, p.2. (UNS S30403) 
Density = 7.94 g/cm3
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Alloy-22—The outer shell of the waste package will use Alloy-22 material composition as shown 
in Table A-3 (see Reference A-1). 
Table A-3. Chemical composition and density of Alloy-22. 
Element  
Composition 
(wt%)  Value Used 
 Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
C  0.015 (max)  0.015  6.5356E-05
Mn  0.50 (max)  0.5  4.7627E-04
Si  0.08 (max)  0.08  1.4906E-04
Cr  20–2.5  21.25  2.1387E-02
Mo  12.5–4.5  13.5  7.3637E-03
Co  2.50 (max)  2.5  2.2199E-03
W  2.5–.5  3.0  8.5397E-04
V  0.35 (max)  0.35  3.5955E-04
Fe  2.0–.0  4.0  3.7483E-03
P  0.02 (max)  0.02  3.3791E-05
S  0.02 (max)  0.02  3.2736E-05
Ni  Balance  54.765  4.8829E-02
Density = 8.69 g/cm3
ASTM B 575 (UNS N06022) 
Carbon Steel—The curved, carbon steel impact plates fit inside each end of the SNF canister (see 
Reference A-1). 
Table A-4. Chemical composition of ASTM A 516 Grade 70 carbon steel. 
Element 
Composition 
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.30 (max.) 0.30 1.1808E-03
Manganese (Mn) 0.85–1.20 1.025 8.8199E-04
Phosphorous (P) 0.035 (max.) 0.035 5.3418E-05
Sulfur (s) 0.035 (max.) 0.035 5.1750E-05
Silicon (Si) 0.15–0.40 0.275 4.6287E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 98.33 8.3236E-02
Source: ASTM A 516/A 516M-90, Table 1 (UNS K02700) 
Density = 7.85 g/cm3
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Table A-5. Composition and density of Savannah River Site high-level waste glass. 
Element/Isotope 
Compositiona
(wt%)
Number Density
[atom/(cmb)]
Element/ 
Isotope
Compositiona
(wt%)
Number Density
[atom/(cmb)]
O 44.77 4.8038E-02 Ag 0.0503 7.9241E-06
U-234 0.0003 2.4048E-08 Ni 0.7349 2.1489E-04
U-235 0.0044 3.1773E-07 Pb 0.0610 5.0495E-06
U-236 0.0010 7.5726E-08 Si 21.8880 1.3375E-02
U-238 1.8666 1.3458E-04 Th 0.1856 1.3727E-05
Pu-238 0.0052 3.7360E-07 Ti 0.5968 2.1397E-04
Pu-239 0.0124 8.9111E-07 B-10 0.5918 1.0143E-03
Pu-240 0.0023 1.6282E-07 B-11 2.6189 4.0826E-03
Pu-241 0.0010 6.8960E-08 Li-6 0.0960 2.7378E-04
Pu-242 0.0002 1.3591E-08 Li-7 1.3804 3.3767E-03
Cs-133 0.0409 5.2878E-06 F 0.0319 2.8774E-05
Cs-135 0.0052 6.5664E-07 Cu 0.1526 4.1225E-05
Ba-137 0.1127 1.4022E-05 Fe 7.3907 2.2714E-03
Al 2.3964 1.5243E-03 K 2.9887 1.3119E-03
S 0.1295 6.9489E-05 Mg 0.8248 5.8238E-04
Ca 0.6619 2.8344E-04 Mn 1.5577 4.8662E-04
P 0.0141 7.7901E-06 Na 8.6284 6.4414E-03
Cr 0.0826 2.7253E-05 Cl 0.1159 5.6112E-05
Densityb at 25qC = 2.85 g/cm3
a. See Reference A-2. 
b. See Reference A-3.
The LiCon material identified in Table A-6 was used to fill the cord-section space between the 
canister shell and the square sleeve internal to the TMI-2 fuel canister.A-4
Table A-6. Low density concrete (LiCon) composition. 
Element  
Number Density  
(atoms/b-cm) 
Oxygen (O)  1.1855E-02 
Sodium (Na)  1.4380E-04 
Aluminum (Al)  2.8385E-03 
Silicon (Si)  8.7196E-04 
Magnesium (Mg)  3.5859E-05 
Calcium (Ca)  1.3101E-03 
Iron (Fe)  1.3576E-05 
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Table A-7 provides the compositions associated with the cladding material used in the 
construction of the TMI-2 PWR assembly.A-5
Table A-7. Composition of Zircaloy-4.  
Element
Composition 
(wt%)
Tin (Sn)  1.20–1.70
Iron (Fe)  0.18–0.24
Chromium (Cr)  0.07–0.13
Nickel (Ni)  —
Niobium (Columbium)  —
Oxygen (O)  —
Iron + chromium + nickel  —
Iron + chromium  0.28–0.37
 Max. Impurities 
(wt%)
Aluminum (Al)  0.0075
Boron (B)  0.00005
Cadmium (Cd)  0.00005
Carbon (C)  0.027
Chromium (Cr)  —
Cobalt (Co)  0.0020
Copper (Cu)  0.0050
Hafnium (Hf)  0.010
Hydrogen (H)  0.0025
Iron (Fe)  —
Magnesium (Mg)  0.0020
Manganese (Mn)  0.0050
Molybdenum (Mo)  0.0050
Nickel (Ni)  0.0070
Nitrogen (N)  0.0080
Phosphorus (P)  —
Silicon (Si)  0.0120
Tin (Sn)  —
Tungsten (W)  0.010
Titanium (Ti)  0.0050
Uranium (U)  0.00035
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Table A-8. Curie content per 15-ft Hanford glass log.A-6
Curies/15-ft Canister 
Isotope
Half-life
(yrs)a
21 Months After 
Fuel Dischargeb 1 Yearc 5 Yearc 10 Yearc 20 Yearc
Fe-55 2.73E-00 2.24E+02 1.74E+02 6.29E+01 1.77E+01 1.40E-00 
Co-60 5.27E-00 6.81E-00 5.97E-00 3.53E-00 1.83E-00 4.91E-01 
Ni-59 7.60E+04 2.16E-01 2.16E-01 2.16E-01 2.16E-01 2.16E-01 
Ni-63 1.00E+02 2.49E+01 2.48E+01 2.41E+01 2.33E+01 2.17E+01 
Sr-90 2.91E+01 6.64E+04 6.48E+04 5.89E+04 5.23E+04 4.12E+04 
Y-90 7.32E-03 6.64E+04 6.48E+04 5.89E+04 5.23E+04 4.12E+04 
Zr-93 1.50E+06 2.05E-00 2.05E-00 2.05E-00 2.05E-00 2.05E-00 
Zr-95 1.75E-01 4.38E-00 8.43E-02 1.15E-08 3.03E-17 2.10E-34 
Nb-95 9.58E-02 9.01E-00 6.50E-03 1.77E-15 3.47E-31 1.33E-62 
Tc-99 2.13E+05 1.49E+01 1.48E+01 1.48E+01 1.48E+01 1.48E+01 
Ru-106 1.02E-00 7.93E+03 4.02E+03 2.65E+02 8.87E-00 9.93E-03 
Rh-106 2.49E-04 7.93E+03 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 
Ag-110m 6.84E-01 2.53E-00 9.17E-01 1.60E-02 1.01E-04 4.04E-09 
Cd-113m 1.41E+01 2.32E+01 2.21E+01 1.81E+01 1.42E+01 8.68E-00 
Sn-119m 8.03E-01 8.61E-00 3.63E-00 1.15E-01 1.53E-03 2.73E-07 
Sn-121m 5.50E+01 1.68E-01 1.66E-01 1.58E-01 1.48E-01 1.31E-01 
Sn-123 3.54E-01 4.59E-00 6.48E-01 2.57E-04 1.44E-08 4.53E-17 
Sb-125 2.76E-00 2.80E+03 2.17E+03 7.96E+02 2.26E+02 1.83E+01 
Sn-126 1.00E+05 7.31E-01 7.31E-01 7.31E-01 7.31E-01 7.30E-01 
Sb-126m 3.40E-02 7.31E-01 1.01E-09 3.68E-45 1.86E-89 4.72E-178 
Te-125m 1.59E-01 6.81E+02 8.70E-00 2.31E-07 7.81E-17 8.94E-36 
Te-127m 2.99E-01 4.76E-00 4.68E-01 4.35E-05 3.98E-10 3.32E-20 
Cs-134 2.07E-00 1.91E+03 1.36E+03 3.56E+02 6.64E+01 2.32E-00 
Cs-135 2.30E+06 3.99E-01 3.99E-01 3.99E-01 3.99E-01 3.99E-01 
Cs-137 3.02E+01 8.10E+04 7.92E+04 7.22E+04 6.44E+04 5.12E+04 
Ba-137m 4.86E-06 7.66E+04 7.48E+04 6.82E+04 6.08E+04 4.84E+04 
Ce-144 7.80E-01 4.73E+04 1.95E+04 5.56E+02 6.53E-00 9.02E-04 
Pm-147 2.62E-00 6.31E+04 4.84E+04 1.68E+04 4.49E+03 3.20E+02 
Sm-151 9.00E+01 1.33E+03 1.32E+03 1.28E+03 1.23E+03 1.14E+03 
Eu-152 1.35E+01 4.35E-00 4.13E-00 3.37E-00 2.60E-00 1.56E-00 
Eu-154 8.59E-00 5.34E+02 4.92E+02 3.56E+02 2.38E+02 1.06E+02 
Eu-155 4.71E-00 6.53E+02 5.63E+02 3.13E+02 1.50E+02 3.44E+01 
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Table A-8. (continued). 
Curies/15-ft Canister 
Isotope
Half-life
(yrs)a
21 Months After 
Fuel Dischargeb 1 Yearc 5 Yearc 10 Yearc 20 Yearc
Heavy Metals       
U-235 7.04E+08 3.13E-04 3.13E-04 3.13E-04 3.13E-04 3.13E-04 
U-238 4.47E+09 5.91E-03 5.91E-03 5.91E-03 5.91E-03 5.91E-03 
Np-237 2.14E+06 3.16E-01 3.16E-01 3.16E-01 3.16E-01 3.16E-01 
Pu-238 8.77E+01 1.22E-00 1.21E-00 1.17E-00 1.13E-00 1.04E-00 
Pu-239 2.41E+04 2.24E-00 2.24E-00 2.24E-00 2.24E-00 2.24E-00 
Pu-240 6.56E+03 8.61E-01 8.61E-01 8.60E-01 8.60E-01 8.59E-01 
Pu-241 1.44E+01 4.10E+01 3.91E+01 3.22E+01 2.53E+01 1.56E+01 
Am-241 4.33E+02 9.16E+02 9.15E+02 9.09E+02 9.02E+02 8.88E+02 
Am-242 1.41E+02 6.51E-01 6.48E-01 6.35E-01 6.20E-01 5.90E-01 
Am-243 7.37E+03 1.07E-01 1.07E-01 1.07E-01 1.07E-01 1.07E-01 
Cm-242 4.46E-01 7.93E-01 1.68E-01 3.35E-04 1.42E-07 2.53E-14 
Cm-244 1.81E+01 1.99E+01 1.91E+01 1.64E+01 1.35E+01 9.23E-00 
a. Chart of the Nuclides, 14th edition, General Electric, 1989.A-7
b. Scaled values based on a ratio of 13.5/8.5 for 15-ft vs. 10-ft glass canister fill. 
c. Calculated values based on decayed half-life values. 
d. Not all isotopes in the referenced source document were included in this table, either because of their low Ci concentrations
or short decay half-lives. 
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Appendix B 
Physical Description Report 
 [Ref. B-1] [Ref. B-2] 
Initial year of manufacture 1971 — 
Final year of manufacture — — 
Total number fabricated to date (Note 1) — 
Assembly width (inches) 8.536 8.54 
Assembly length (inches) 165.625 165.6 
Rod pitch (inches) 0.568 0.568 
Total assembly weight (lb) 1515.0 1510 to 1588 
Weight of heavy metal (lb) 1022.12 (Note 2) 
Weight of UO2 (lb) (Note 2) 1159 
Metric tonnes initial heavy metal (metric tons) 0.45363 — 
Enrichment range (% U-235) 2.0–4.0 — 
Average pellet enrichment (% U-235) — 2.57 
Average design burnup (MWd/MTIHM) 35000 — 
Maximum design burnup (MWd/MTIHM) 50200 — 
Note 1: Total quantity fabricated to date (as of 1987) = 3764 assemblies. 
Note 2: The heavy metal (U) reported at 1022.12 lb translates into: [[(238.0289)+32]/238.0289]*1022.12 lb U = 1159.53 lb UO2.
Table B-1. Fuel assembly hardware parts and materials. 
Part Name 
Parts/
Assembly 
Weight (kg)/ 
Assembly Zone Material Name 
Material
Fraction
Top nozzle 1 7.4800 Top Stainless steel CF3M 1.00000 
Bottom nozzle 1 8.1600 Bottom Stainless steel CF3M 1.00000 
Guide tubes 16 8.0000 In core Zircaloy-4 1.00000 
Instrument tube 1 0.6400 In core Zircaloy-4 1.00000 
Spacer-plenum 1 1.0400 Gas plenum Inconel-718 1.00000 
Spacer-bottom 1 1.3000 Bottom Inconel-718 1.00000 
Spacer-incore 6 4.9000 In core Zircaloy-4 1.00000 
Spring retainer 1 0.9100 Top Stainless steel CF3M 1.00000 
Holddown spring 1 1.800 Top Inconel-718 1.00000 
Upper end plug 2 0.0600 Top Stainless steel 304 1.00000 
Upper nut 15 0.5100 Top Stainless steel 304L 1.00000 
Lower nut 16 0.1500 Bottom Stainless steel 304 1.00000 
Grid supports 7 0.6400 In core Zircaloy-4 1.00000 
Drawing number associated with assembly: Drawing number 1155248 F Rev.0 (See Reference B-3).  
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Table B-2. Fuel rod description table. 
  [Ref. B-1]  [Ref. B-2] 
Type of Rod  Per Fuel Rod   
Fuel rod positions per assembly  225  225 
Typical number of fueled rods per assembly  208  204 (Note 1) 
Guide tubes per assembly  16  — 
Instrument tubes per assembly  1  — 
Rod diameter (inches)  0.430  0.430 
Rod length (inches)  153.68  153.2 
Active length (inches)  141.8  144 
Weight per rod (lb)  7.0  6.87 
Clad material  Zircaloy-4  Zircaloy-4 
Clad thickness  0.0265  0.0265 
Fuel-clad gap (inches)  0.0042  0.0035 
Fill gas used  He  He 
Initial gas pressure (psig)  415  450 
Nitrogen content of fill gas (percent)  3.0  — 
177 subassemblies/core [Ref. B-4]     
Fuel pellet material  Uranium oxide (UO2)  Uranium oxide (UO2)
Fuel pellet shape  Dished, chamfered  Cylindrical 
Fuel pellet diameter (inches)  0.3686  0.370 
Fuel pellet length (inches)  0.435  0.7 (Note 2) 
Fuel pellet weight per rod (lbs)  5.58  5.57 
Open porosity (percent)  <1%  — 
Grain size (microns)  10–14  — 
Fuel density (% theoretical)  95  92.5 + 1.5 
O/U ratio  2–2.02 : 1  — 
Smear density (g/cm3)  9.75  — 
Spacer pellet length (inches)  —  0.440 
Plenum spring material  Stainless steel 302  304 stainless steel 
Plenum spring weight per assembly (lb)  0.42  0.04 
Plenum length (inches)  11.72  — 
Plenum volume (cubic inches)  1.308  — 
Note 1. The 204 fuel rod count is in conflict with written text and a figure in Ref. B-2 that indicates 208 is the loaded fuel rod 
count; this 204 rod count from the Ref. B-2 table is thought to be in error. 
Note 2. This published length represents a significant deviation from fuel pellet length in typical PWR assemblies and is also 
thought to be in error. Total mass for uranium in the fuel rod is in close agreement with Reference B-4, and use of fuel pellets of 
smaller dimensions to create an optimized configuration will negate this assumed error. 
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Appendix C 
Data from Spent Fuel Database 
The following information (Table C-1) was captured from data in the Spent Fuel Database 
maintained by the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program.C-1 The weights for the fissile materials and total 
heavy metals are reported with associated uncertainties. The quantities of both fissile and heavy metals 
without the associated uncertainties form the basis of quantities reported to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) in an NRC-licensed storage facility for the Three Mile Island (TMI) canisters. 
There are varying, reported numbers of TMI Unit 2 (TMI-2) canisters between those shipped 
from TMI by GPU to the INEEL (344) and those eventually placed in storage (341) pending packaging 
and shipment to the repository. Between 1988 and 1995, the sample debris and metallurgical samples 
from some of the canisters were returned to Test Area North and placed into three canisters (D-153, 
D-388, and D-389). Canister D-388 was also contains samples the Halden, H. B. Robins, and Dresden 
reactors. In 2001, canister D-388 and D-389 were combined leaving only two canisters of sample 
material.C-2 Canisters D-153 and D-388 are currently stored in a 125-B Cask in the Test Area North Hot 
Shop and are not candidates for repository disposal at this time. 
For a simplifying assumption, the blend of Pu-239 and Pu-241 should be modeled at strictly 
Pu-239 because the small, fractional portion of Pu-241 can be adequately represented by the Pu-239. 
Furthermore, although the balance of Pu [total Pu – (Pu-239 + Pu-241)] can be assumed to be Pu-240, its 
presence in any package should be neglected. Any Pu-240 contribution as a parasitic neutron capture 
agent will disappear with time (6.56 E03 year half-life); therefore, to neglect its initial presence represents 
a more conservative criticality modeling approach. 
Table C-1. TMI canister inventories. 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D101 7.53 ± 2.00 291.60 ± 79.40 0.420 ± 0.123 0.447 ± 0.131 
D104 7.45 ± 2.26 275.50 ± 89.90 0.361 ± 0.139 0.384 ± 0.148 
D105 7.09 ± 0.76 332.90 ± 35.30 0.637 ± 0.067 0.678 ± 0.071 
D106 7.25 ± 0.78 340.30 ± 36.10 0.651 ± 0.068 0.693 ± 0.073 
D107 3.61 ± 1.62 161.90 ± 74.70 0.282 ± 0.137 0.310 ± 0.148 
D108 7.17 ± 0.77 336.50 ± 35.70 0.644 ± 0.068 0.685 ± 0.072 
D110 4.09 ± 0.44 192.00 ± 20.50 0.367 ± 0.039 0.391 ± 0.041 
D111 7.16 ± 0.77 336.30 ± 15.70 0.643 ± 0.067 0.684 ± 0.072 
D112 6.79 ± 0.73 318.90 ± 33.80 0.610 ± 0.064 0.649 ± 0.068 
D113 4.49 ± 0.48 210.80 ± 22.50 0.403 ± 0.042 0.429 ± 0.045 
D114 1.55 ± 0.17 72.60 ± 8.10 0.139 ± 0.015 0.148 ± 0.016 
D116 7.39 ± 0.79 347.00 ± 36.80 0.664 ± 0.070 0.706 ± 0.074 
D117 6.85 ± 0.73 321.50 ± 34.10 0.615 ± 0.065 0.654 ± 0.069 
D118 0.24 ± 0.06 11.40 ± 2.80 0.022 ± 0.005 0.023 ± 0.006 
D119 10.06 ± 2.60 376.50 ± 97.30 0.506 ± 0.131 0.539 ± 0.139 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D120 0.86 ± 0.11 40.60 ± 5.10 0.078 ± 0.010 0.083 ± 0.010 
D121 4.09 ± 0.44 191.80 ± 20.50 0.367 ± 0.039 0.390 ± 6.041 
D122 8.94 ± 2.42 339.80 ± 96.20 0.472 ± 0.149 0.502 ± 0.158 
D125 6.82 ± 0.73 320.30 ± 34.00 0.613 ± 0.064 0.652 ± 0.069 
D126 6.38 ± 0.68 299.60 ± 31.80 0.573 ± 0.060 0.610 ± 0.064 
D127 6.94 ± 0.74 325.50 ± 34.60 0.623 ± 0.065 0.663 ± 0.070 
D128 6.96 ± 0.75 326.50 ± 34.70 0.624 ± 0.066 0.665 ± 0.070 
D129 7.85 ± 1.76 353.80 ± 79.10 0.678 ± 0.152 0.734 ± 0.164 
D131 6.53 ± 0.70 306.50 ± 32.70 0.586 ± 0.062 0.624 ± 0.066 
D132 7.31 ± 0.78 343.20 ± 36.40 0.656 ± 0.069 0.698 ± 0.073 
D136. 1.62 ± 0.68 73.80 ± 30.80 0.133 ± 0.055 0.144 ± 0.060 
D137 3.64 ± 0.39 170.60 ± 18.20 0.326 ± 0.034 0.347 ± 0.037 
D138 0.51 ± 0.21 24.00 ± 10.10 0.046 ± 0.019 0.049 ± 0.020 
D139 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
D140 0.40 ± 0.24 18.70 ± 11.10 0.036 ± 0.021 0.038 ± 0.023 
D141 2.76 ± 0.86 130.10 ± 41.20 0.230 ± 0.075 0.250 ± 0.082 
D142 6.30 ± 0.68 295.60 ± 31.40 0.565 ± 0.059 0.602 ± 0.063 
D143 7.52 ± 0.81 352.90 ± 37.40 0.675 ± 0.071 0.718 ± 0.075 
D144 6.94 ± 0.74 325.80 ± 34.60 0.623 ± 0.065 0.663 ± 0.070 
D145 7.98 ± 0.85 374.30 ± 39.70 0.716 ± 0.075 0.762 ± 0.080 
D146 8.06 ± 0.86 378.40 ± 40.10 0.724 ± 0.076 0.770 ± 0.081 
D147 7.84 ± 0.84 368.10 ± 39.00 0.704 ± 0.074 0.749 ± 0.079 
D148 7.90 ± 0.85 370.80 ± 39.30 0.709 ± 0.074 0.755 ± 0.079 
D149 7.86 ± 0.84 369.10 ± 39.10 0.706 ± 0.074 0.751 ± 0.079 
D150 7.35 ± 0.79 344.80 ± 36.60 0.660 ± 0.069 0.702 ± 0.074 
D151 8.23 ± 0.88 386.50 ± 41.00 0.739 ± 0.077 0.787 ± 0.083 
D152 6.86 ± 0.73 322.00 ± 34.20 0.616 ± 0.065 0.655 ± 0.069 
D153 0.27 ± 0.25 12.70 ± 11.90 0.024 ± 0.023 0.026 ± 0.024 
D154 5.74 ± 1.58 214.60 ± 59.00 0.288 ± 0.079 0.307 ± 0.084 
D155 0.24 ± 0.25 10.50 ± 10.90 0.020 ± 0.021 0.022 ± 0.023 
D156 8.13 ± 0.87 381.70 ± 40.50 0.730 ± 0.077 0.777 ± 0.082 
D157 6.97 ± 0.75 327.20 ± 34.70 0.626 ± 0.066 0.666 ± 0.070 
D158 7.62 ± 0.82 357.70 ± 37.90 0.684 ± 0.072 0.728 ± 0.076 
D159 0.20 ± 0.06 9.50 ± 2.80 0.018 ± 0.005 0.019 ± 0.006 
D160 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
D161 7.45 ± 0.80 349.60 ± 37.10 0.669 ± 0.070 0.712 ± 0.075 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D162 6.31 ± 1.79 327.10 ± 91.30 0.664 ± 0.184 0.726 ± 0.200 
D163 7.29 ± 0.78 342.00 ± 36.30 0.654 ± 0.069 0.696 ± 0.073 
D164 6.75 ± 0.72 317.00 ± 33.60 0.606 ± 0.064 0.645 ± 0.068 
D165 7.32 ± 0.78 343.60 ± 36.50 0.657 ± 0.069 0.699 ± 0.073 
D166 8.11 ± 0.87 380.50 ± 40.40 0.728 ± 0.076 0.775 ± 0.081 
D167 4.93 ± 0.53 231.50 ± 24.60 0.443 ± 0.047 0.471 ± 0.050 
D168 3.42 ± 0.38 160.50 ± 17.80 0.307 ± 0.034 0.327 ± 0.036 
D169 7.66 ± 0.82 359.30 ± 38.10 0.687 ± 0.072 0.731 ± 0.077 
D170 6.97 ± 0.75 327.00 ± 34.70 0.625 ± 0.066 0.666 ± 0.070 
D171 4.88 ± 0.52 228.90 ± 24.40 0.438 ± 0.046 0.466 ± 0.049 
D172 8.78 ± 2.42 332.60 ± 96.20 0.458 ± 0.149 0.488 ± 0.158 
D173 7.67 ± 1.99 327.10 ± 85.60 0.522 ± 0.139 0.563 ± 0.151 
D174 1.49 ± 0.17 69.70 ± 7.80 0.133 ± 0.015 0.142 ± 0.016 
D175 3.15 ± 0.34 148.00 ± 15.90 0.283 ± 0.030 0.301 ± 0.032 
D176 6.00 ± 0.64 281.80 ± 29.90 0.539 ± 0.057 0.574 ± 0.060 
D177 7.62 ± 0.82 357.40 ± 37.90 0.684 ± 0.072 0.728 ± 0.076 
D178 5.78 ± 2.02 208.70 ± 80.30 0.259 ± 0.124 0.276 ± 0.132 
D179 5.61 ± 0.60 263.20 ± 28.00 0.503 ± 0.053 0.536 ± 0.056 
D180 8.40 ± 0.90 394.10 ± 41.80 0.754 ± 0.079 0.802 ± 0.084 
D181 7.55 ± 0.81 354.30 ± 37.60 0.678 ± 0.071 0.721 ± 0.076 
D182 3.42 ± 0.37 160.40 ± 17.20 0.307 ± 0.032 0.326 ± 0.035 
D183 5.32 ± 0.57 249.90 ± 26.6 0.478 ± 0.050 0.509 ± 0.054 
D184 2.19 ± 0.25 102.70 ± 11.60 0.196 ± 0.022 0.209 ± 0.023 
D185 6.14 ± 0.66 287.90 ± 30.60 0.551 ± 0.058 0.586 ± 0.062 
D186 6.87 ± 0.74 322.50 ± 34.20 0.617 ± 0.065 0.656 ± 0.069 
D187 7.52 ± 1.92 281.50 ± 71.80 0.378 ± 0.096 0.403 ± 0.103 
D188 8.42 ± 0.90 395.30 ± 41.90 0.756 ± 0.079 0.805 ± 0.084 
D189 7.65 ± 0.82 358.90 ± 38.10 0.686 ± 0.072 0.730 ± 0.077 
D190 7.15 ± 1.94 267.40 ± 72.50 0.359 ± 0.097 0.383 ± 0.104 
D191  5.64 ± 2.74 211.10 ± 103.00 0.284 ± 0.138 0.302 ± 0.147 
D192 8.90 ± 2.31 343.30 ± 92.10 0.491 ± 0.142 0.522 ± 0.152 
D193 9.41 ± 2.49 351.90 ± 93.00 0.473 ± 0.125 0.504 ± 0.133 
D194 3.96 ± 0.43 185.60 ± 19.80 0.355 ± 0.037 0.378 ± 0.040 
D195 6.93 ± 1.47 278.70 ± 58.80 0.429 ± 0.092 0.457 ± 0.098 
D196 6.77 ± 0.73 317.90 ± 33.70 0.608 ± 0.064 0.647 ± 0.068 
D197 6.79 ± 0.73 318.90 ± 33.80 0.610 ± 0.064 0.649 ± 0.068 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D198 0.21 ± 0.06 10.00 ± 2.80 0.019 ± 0.005 0.020 ± 0.006 
D199 6.21 ± 0.67 291.30 ± 30.90 0.557 ± 0.058 0.593 ± 0.062 
D200 0.10 ± 0.06 4.50 ± 2.60 0.009 ± 0.005 0.009 ± 0.005 
D201 0.20 ± 0.06 9.50 ± 2.80 0.018 ± 0.005 0.019 ± 0.006 
D203 6.47 ± 1.69 349.50 ± 89.20 0.716 ± 0.181 0.781 ± 0.198 
D204 4.24 ± 0.46 198.90 ± 21.20 0.381 ± 0.040 0.405 ± 0.043 
D205 3.66 ± 0.40 171.70 ± 18.40 0.328 ± 0.035 0.349 ± 0.037 
D206 8.60 ± 2.66 322.00 ± 106.00 0.434 ± 0.164 0.462 ± 0.174 
D207 5.47 ± 0.59 256.50 ± 27.3 0.491 ± 0.052 0.522 ± 0.055 
D208 2.99 ± 0.32 140.30 ± 15.10 0.268 ± 0.029 0.286 ± 0.030 
D209 5.87 ± 0.63 275.60 ± 29.30 0.527 ± 0.055 0.561 ± 0.059 
D210 2.62 ± 0.29 122.90 ± 13.30 0.235 ± 0.025 0.250 ± 0.027 
D211 5.48 ± 0.84 254.80 ± 38.80 0.479 ± 0.072 0.513 ± 0.077 
D212 2.45 ± 0.27 115.00 ± 12.50 0.220 ± 0.02 0.234 ± 0.025 
D213 5.13 ± 0.55 240.80 ± 25.60 0.461 ± 0.048 0.490 ± 0.052 
D214 6.40 ± 0.69 300.60 ± 31.90 0.575 ± 0.060 0.612 ± 0.064 
D215 9.11 ± 2.61 347.70 ± 104.00 0.487 ± 0.161 0.518 ± 0.171 
D216 8.07 ± 2.47 297.20 ± 98.20 0.386 ± 0.152 0.411 ± 0.162 
D217 4.82 ± 0.52 226.20 ± 24.10 0.433 ± 0.046 0.460 ± 0.049 
D218 2.01 ± 0.22 94.20 ± 10.30 0.180 ± 0.019 0.192 ± 0.021 
D219 9.02 ± 2.35 369.00 ± 95.70 0.613 ± 0.158 0.663 ± 0.171 
D220 3.77 ± 1.21 171.60 ± 55.40 0.309 ± 0.102 0.335 ± 0.110 
D221 6.61 ± 1.74 330.20 ± 86.30 0.663 ± 0.173 0.725 ± 0.189 
D222 7.18 ± 1.87 275.90 ± 74.40 0.392 ± 0.115 0.417 ± 0.123 
D223 8.55 ± 2.13 331.60 ± 84.90 0.478 ± 0.131 0.509 ± 0.140 
D224 5.56 ± 1.38 248.90 ± 62.10 0.477 ± 0.119 0.518 ± 0.129 
D225 2.27 ± 0.25 106.70 ± 11.60 0.204 ± 0.022 0.217 ± 0.023 
D226 6.46 ± 1.60 324.90 ± 79.70 0.651 ± 0.159 0.709 ± 0.173 
D227 5.59 ± 1.46 337.30 ± 87.80 0.717 ± 0.187 0.788 ± 0.205 
D228 7.06 ± 1.85 312.50 ± 81.90 0.600 ± 0.157 0.654 ± 0.171 
D229 5.71 ± 1.50 302.10 ± 79.70 0.618 ± 0.163 0.677 ± 0.179 
D230 5.49 ± 1.47 302.10 ± 79.70 0.625 ± 0.164 0.686 ± 0.180 
D231 8.75 ± 2.22 327.30 ± 83.00 0.440 ± 0.112 0.468 ± 0.119 
D232 9.29 ± 2.40 369.20 ± 95.70 0.577 ± 0.151 0.621 ± 0.163 
D233 8.09 ± 1.82 342.90 ± 76.60 0.593 ± 0.133 0.638 ± 0.143 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D234 8.75 ± 2.22 327.30 ± 83.00 0.440 ± 0.112 0.468 ± 0.119 
D235 8.42 ± 2.31 319.10 ± 92.00 0.440 ± 0.142 0.469 ± 0.151 
D236 6.12 ± 1.58 309.10 ± 78.70 0.620 ± 0.157 0.676 ± 0.171 
D237 6.79 ± 1.77 305.90 ± 80.60 0.518 ± 0.138 0.562 ± 0.150 
D238 6.35 ± 1.70 309.10 ± 82.30 0.615 ± 0.164 0.672 ± 0.179 
D239 7.62 ± 2.22 285.50 ± 88.60 0.386 ± 0.138 0.411 ± 0.147 
D240 4.72 ± 1.30 284.60 ± 78.40 0.605 ± 0.167 0.665 ± 0.183 
D241 9.10 ± 2.35 435.50 ± 113.00 0.861 ± 0.222 0.941 ± 0.243 
D242 6.74 ± 1.81 316.10 ± 85.40 0.620 ± 0.168 0.677 ± 0.184 
D243 6.14 ± 1.67 295.00 ± 80.50 0.584 ± 0.160 0.638 ± 0.175 
D244 5.81 ± 1.55 302.10 ± 79.70 0.615 ± 0.162 0.673 ± 0.177 
D245 7.35 ± 1.94 284.90 ± 75.60 0.419 ± 0.114 0.449 ± 0.122 
D246 6.19 ± 1.62 305.60 ± 80.50 0.611 ± 0.161 0.668 ± 0.177 
D247 6.36 ± 1.02 291.90 ± 46.10 0.559 ± 0.088 0.600 ± 0.095 
D248 8.82 ± 2.34 336.80 ± 93.10 0.472 ± 0.144 0.503 ± 0.153 
D250 8.14 ± 2.13 312.20 ± 84.80 0.441 ± 0.131 0.469 ± 0.140 
D251 7.34 ± 1.87 274.50 ± 70.00 0.369 ± 0.094 0.393 ± 0.100 
D252 8.75 ± 2.22 327.30 ± 83.00 0.440 ± 0.112 0.468 ± 0.119 
D253 8.75 ± 2.26 336.20 ± 90.00 0.477 ± 0.139 0.508 ± 0.148 
D254 7.17 ± 1.92 309.30 ± 84.10 0.526 ± 0.146 0.570 ± 0.158 
D255 5.83 ± 1.59 305.60 ± 83.00 0.623 ± 0.169 0.683 ± 0.185 
D256 9.22 ± 2.33 344.80 ± 87.40 0.463 ± 0.117 0.493 ± 0.125 
D257 7.96 ± 2.06 344.70 ± 89.80 0.559 ± 0.148 0.605 ± 0.160 
D258 8.78 ± 2.39 333.10 ± 95.10 0.461 ± 0.147 0.491 ± 0.157 
D259 8.61 ± 2.21 331.70 ± 87.90 0.472 ± 0.136 0.503 ± 0.145 
D260 9.66 ± 2.42 373.80 ± 96.40 0.537 ± 0.149 0.571 ± 0.159 
D261 7.15 ± 1.90 267.40 ± 71.30 0.359 ± 0.096 0.383 ± 0.102 
D262 5.42 ± 1.91 245.60 ± 86.40 0.412 ± 0.150 0.449 ± 0.162 
D263 9.03 ± 2.29 348.50 ± 91.10 0.498 ± 0.141 0.531 ± 0.150 
D264 5.62 ± 1.48 288.00 ± 76.30 0.583 ± 0.155 0.639 ± 0.170 
D265 6.58 ± 1.69 246.30 ± 63.20 0.331 ± 0.085 0.352 ± 0.090 
D266 5.18 ± 1.36 312.70 ± 82.00 0.664 ± 0.174 0.731 ± 0.191 
D267 8.12 ± 2.12 351.70 ± 91.50 0.571 ± 0.149 0.618 ± 0.161 
D268 8.09 ± 2.06 302.60 ± 77.00 0.407 ± 0.103 0.433 ± 0.110 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D269 7.32 ± 1.87 282.80 ± 74.40 0.405 ± 0.115 0.431 ± 0.123 
D270 7.98 ± 2.09 309.50 ± 81.40 0.456 ± 0.123 0.489 ± 0.132 
D271 8.33 ± 2.16 323.70 ± 85.70 0.460 ± 0.128 0.492 ± 0.137 
D272 5.64 ± 1.54 302.10 ± 82.20 0.620 ± 0.169 0.680 ± 0.185 
D273 7.70 ± 2.03 365.20 ± 96.90 0.720 ± 0.191 0.786 ± 0.209 
D274 5.81 ± 1.53 302.10 ± 79.70 0.615 ± 0.162 0.673 ± 0.178 
D275 5.63 ± 1.08 247.20 ± 44.30 0.435 ± 0.072 0.463 ± 0.077 
D276 8.49 ± 2.18 371.20 ± 95.70 0.616 ± 0.162 0.665 ± 0.174 
D277 6.87 ± 1.84 330.10 ± 88.70 0.654 ± 0.176 0.715 ± 0.192 
D278 5.77 ± 1.50 347.90 ± 90.40 0.739 ± 0.192 0.813 ± 0.211 
D279 7.02 ± 2.01 303.80 ± 89.10 0.493 ± 0.153 0.533 ± 0.164 
D280 6.74 ± 1.93 350.50 ± 98.70 0.712 ± 0.199 0.780 ± 0.217 
D281 5.61 ± 1.50 281.00 ± 74.70 0.565 ± 0.150 0.618 ± 0.164 
D282 5.10 ± 1.62 258.50 ± 81.20 0.522 ± 0.162 0.572 ± 0.177 
D283 7.57 ± 1.95 400.50 ± 103.00 0.819 ± 0.211 0.898 ± 0.232 
D284 6.68 ± 1.41 329.60 ± 70.60 0.654 ± 0.141 0.709 ± 0.153 
D285 8.93 ± 2.31 343.10 ± 92.10 0.486 ± 0.142 0.518 ± 0.152 
D286 4.58 ± 1.46 203.40 ± 65.70 0.390 ± 0.126 0.425 ± 0.136 
D287 6.61 ± 2.51 228.10 ± 99.80 0.252 ± 0.155 0.268 ± 0.165 
D288 6.37 ± 1.72 312.60 t 84.60 0.624 ± 0.169 0.682 ± 0.185 
D289 5.87 ± 1.57 259.80 ± 69.40 0.499 ± 0.133 0.543 ± 0.145 
D290 7.99 ± 2.26 300.80 ± 89.90 0.409 ± 0.139 0.436 ± 0.148 
D291 8.37 ± 2.18 323.60 ± 84.80 0.473 ± 0.126 0.507 ± 0.136 
D292 5.21 ± 1.38 267.00 ± 71.40 0.541 ± 0.145 0.592 ± 0.159 
D293 5.58 ± 1.49 302.10 ± 79.70 0.622 ± 0.164 0.683 ± 0.179 
D294 8.03 ± 2.07 337.70 ± 88.10 0.531 ± 0.141 0.572 ± 0.153 
D295 7.40 ± 1.98 316.4 ± 85.70 0.530 ± 0.147 0.573 ± 0.159 
D296 6.66 ± 1.74 340.70 ± 89.80 0.689 ± 0.182 0.755 ± 0.199 
D297 6.29 ± 1.88 236.00 ± 74.70 0.319 ± 0.116 0.340 ± 0.123 
D298 7.59 ± 1.59 375.60 ± 78.60 0.745 ± 0.157 0.809 ± 0.170 
D299 9.37 ± 2.60 353.90 ± 104.00 0.485 ± 0.160 0.516 ± 0.170 
D300 6.90 ± 1.66 386.50 ± 90.80 0.799 ± 0.187 0.871 ± 0.204 
D301 5.89 ± 1.55 309.10 ± 81.30 0.631 ± 0.166 0.691 ± 0.182 
D302 3.85 ± 0.41 180.60 ± 19.30 0.345 ± 0.036 0.368 ± 0.039 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D303 7.05 ± 1.83 273.50 ± 72.90 0.395 ± 0.113 0.420 ± 0.120 
D304 7.44 ± 2.07 331.60 ± 93.20 0.636 ± 0.179 0.691 ± 0.193 
D305 8.62 ± 2.29 329.20 ± 91.00 0.461 ± 0.141 0.491 ± 0.150 
D306 8.38 ± 2.13 323.30 ± 84.80 0.462 ± 0.131 0.492 ± 0.140 
D307 8.93 ± 2.27 334.30 ± 84.70 0.449 ± 0.114 0.478 ± 0.121 
D308 4.89 ± 1.38 190.90 ± 54.90 0.279 ± 0.085 0.297 ± 0.091 
D309 6.37 ± 0.68 299.10 ± 31.80 0.572 ± 0.060 0.609 ± 0.064 
D310 3.10 ± 0.34 145.40 ± 15.60 0.278 ± 0.030 0.296 ± 0.031 
D311 5.35 ± 0.57 251.10 ± 26.70 0.480 ± 0.050 0.511 ± 0.054 
D312 4.14 ± 0.45 194.40 ± 20.70 0.372 ± 0.039 0.396 ± 0.042 
D313 5.54 ± 0.59 259.90 ± 27.60 0.497 ± 0.052 0.529 ± 0.056 
D314 3.44 ± 0.37 161.60 ± 17.30 0.309 ± 0.033 0.329 ± 0.035 
D315 2.51 ± 0.27 118.00 ± 12.80 0.226 ± 0.024 0.240 ± 0.026 
D316 4.51 ± 0.49 211.80 ± 22.60 0.405 ± 0.043 0.431 ± 0.045 
D317 2.60 ± 0.28 122.10 ± 13.20 0.233 ± 0.025 0.248 ± 0.027 
D318 6.51 ± 0.70 305.60 ± 32.40 0.584 ± 0.061 0.622 ± 0.065 
D319 2.18 ± 0.26 102.10 ± 12.20 0.195 ± 0.023 0.208 ± 0.025 
D320 4.44 ± 0.48 208.20 ± 22.20 0.398 ± 0.042 0.424 ± 0.045 
D321 6.73 ± 0.72 316.00 ± 33.50 0.604 ± 0.063 0.643 ± 0.068 
D322 4.44 ± 0.48 208.50 ± 22.20 0.399 ± 0.042 0.424 ± 0.045 
D323 2.44 ± 0.30 114.60 ± 14.00 0.219 ± 0.026 0.233 ± 0.028 
D324 5.33 ± 0.57 250.30 ± 26.70 0.479 ± 0.051 0.510 ± 0.054 
D325 7.06 ± 0.76 331.30 ± 35.20 0.634 ± 0.066 0.674 ± 0.071 
D326 3.47 ± 0.39 162.90 ± 17.90 0.312 ± 0.034 0.332 ± 0.036 
D327 8.24 ± 0.88 386.70 ± 41.00 0.740 ± 0.078 0.787 ± O.083 
D328 6.50 ± 0.70 304.80 ± 32.40 0.583 ± 0.061 0.621 ± 0.065 
D329 8.16 ± 0.87 383.10 ± 40.60 0.733 ± 0.077 0.780 ± 0.082 
D330 8.58 ± 0.92 402.70 ± 42.70 0.770 ± 0.081 0.820 ± 0.086 
D331 8.51 ± 0.91 399.30 ± 42.30 0.764 ± 0.080 0.813 ± 0.085 
D332 8.47 ± 0.91 397.40 ± 42.10 0.760 ± 0.080 0.809 ± 0.085 
D333 7.14 ± 0.77 335.30 ± 35.60 0.641 ± 0.067 0.683 ± 0.072 
D334 7.29 ± 0.78 342.20 ± 36.30 0.655 ± 0.069 0.697 ± 0.073 
D335 7.61 ± 0.81 357.00 ± 37.90 0.683 ± 0.072 0.727 ± 0.076 
D336 7.66 ± 0.82 359.60 ± 38.10 0.688 ± 0.072 0.732 ± 0.077 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D337 7.88 ± 0.84 369.80 ± 39.20 0.707 ± 0.074 0.753 ± 0.079 
D338 7.39 ± 0.79 346.70 ± 36.80 0.663 ± 0.070 0.706 ± 0.074 
D339 7.71 ± 0.83 362.00 ± 38.40 0.692 ± 0.073 0.737 ± 0.077 
D340 7.82 ± 0.84 367.20 ± 38.90 0.702 ± 0.074 0.747 ± 0.078 
D341 7.86 ± 0.84 369.10 ± 39.10 0.706 ± 0.074 0.751 ± 0.079 
D342 8.06 ± 0.86 378.10 ± 40.10 0.723 ± 0.076 0.770 ± 0.081 
D343 7.40 ± 0.79 347.40 ± 36.90 0.665 ± 0.070 0.707 ± 0.074 
D344 4.16 ± 0.45 195.20 ± 20.90 0.373 ± 0.039 0.397 ± 0.042 
D346 7.92 ± 0.85 371.70 ± 39.40 0.711 ± 0.075 0.757 ± 0.079 
D347 7.43 ± 0.80 348.90 ± 37.00 0.667 ± 0.070 0.710 ± 0.075 
D348 7.96 ± 0.85 373.40 ± 39.60 0.714 ± 0.075 0.760 ± 0.080 
D349 7.87 ± 0.84 369.30 ± 39.20 0.706 ± 0.074 0.752 ± 0.079 
D350 8.45 ± 0.90 396.70 ± 42.10 0.759 ± 0.080 0.807 ± 0.085 
D351 7.93 ± 0.85 372.20 ± 39.50 0.712 ± 0.075 0.758 ± 0.080 
D352 7.98 ± 0.85 374.60 ± 39.70 0.716 ± 0.075 0.762 ± 0.080 
D353 7.85 ± 0.84 368.60 ± 39.10 0.705 ± 0.074 0.750 ± 0.079 
D354 7.74 ± 0.83 363.10 ± 38.50 0.695 ± 0.073 0.739 ± 0.078 
D355 7.45 ± 0.80 349.60 ± 37.10 0.669 ± 0.070 0.712 ± 0.075 
D356 7.68 ± 0.82 360.50 ± 38.20 0.690 ± 0.072 0.734 ± 0.077 
D357 8.30 ± 0.89 389.30 ± 41.30 0.745 ± 0.078 0.792 ± 0.083 
D358 8.19 ± 0.88 384.30 ± 40.80 0.735 ± 0.077 0.782 ± 0.082 
D359 7.81 ± 0.84 366.50 ± 38.90 0.701 ± 0.074 0.746 ± 0.078 
D360 7.61 ± 0.81 357.00 ± 37.90 0.683 ± 0.072 0.727 ± 0.076 
D361 8.50 ± 0.91 398.80 ± 42.30 0.763 ± 0.080 0.812 ± 0.085 
D362 8.24 ± 0.88 386.70 ± 41.00 0.740 ± 0.078 0.787 ± 0.083 
D363 7.75 ± 0.83 363.60 ± 38.60 0.695 ± 0.073 0.740 ± 0.078 
D364 7.16 ± 0.77 336.00 ± 35.70 0.643 ± 0.067 0.684 ± 0.072 
D365 6.13 ± 0.66 287.50 ± 30.50 0.550 ± 0.058 0.585 ± 0.062 
D366 7.63 ± 0.82 358.20 ± 38.00 0.685 ± 0.072 0.729 ± 0.077 
D367 7.56 ± 0.81 354.80 ± 37.60 0.679 ± 0.071 0.722 ± 0.076 
D368 7.63 ± 0.82 358.20 ± 38.00 0.685 ± 0.072 0.729 ± 0.077 
D369 7.35 ± 0.79 345.10 ± 36.60 0.660 ± 0.069 0.702 ± 0.074 
D370 8.15 ± 0.87 382.40 ± 40.60 0.731 ± 0.077 0.778 ± 0.082 
D371 7.16 ± 0.77 336.30 ± 35.70 0.643 ± 0.067 0.684 ± 0.072 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
D373 5.24 ± 0.56 246.10 ± 26.20 0.471 ± 0.049 0.501 ± 0.053 
D374 3.12 ± 0.34 146.60 ± 15.70 0.280 ± 0.030 0.298 ± 0.032 
D376 8.18 ± 0.88 383.90 ± 40.70 0.734 ± 0.077 0.781 ± 0.082 
D378 4.39 ± 0.47 206.10 ± 22.00 0.394 ± 0.042 0.419 ± 0.044 
D379 8.02 ± 0.86 376.50 ± 39.90 0.720 ± 0.076 0.766 ± 0.080 
D384 8.28 ± 0.89 388.60 ± 41.20 0.743 ± 0.078 0.791 ± 0.083 
D385 7.38 ± 0.79 346.30 ± 36.70 0.662 ± 0.069 0.705 ± 0.074 
D386 7.39 ± 0.79 346.70 ± 36.80 0.663 ± 0.070 0.706 ± 0.074 
D390 7.58 ± 0.81 355.50 ± 37.70 0.680 ± 0.071 0.724 ± 0.076 
D391 7.95 ± 0.85 372.90 ± 39.60 0.713 ± 0.075 0.759 ± 0.080 
F401 0.11 ± 0.03 5.20 ± 1.20 0.010 ± 0.002 0.011 ± 0.002 
F402 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F403 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F404 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F406 0.10 ± 0.02 4.50 ± 1.00 0.009 ± 0.002 0.009 ± 0.002 
F407 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F408 0.04 ± 0.01 1.70 ± 0.40 0.003 ± 0.001 0.003 ± 0.001 
F409 0.12 ± 0.03 5.70 ± 1.30 0.011 ± 0.002 0.012 ± 0.003 
F410 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F411 0.03 ± 0.01 1.40 ± 0.30 0.003 ± 0.001 0.003 ± 0.001 
F412 0.12 ± 0.03 5.70 ± 1.30 0.011 ± 0.002 0.012 ± 0.003 
F413 0.53 ± 0.12 25.00 ± 5.60 0.048 ± 0.011 0.051 ± 0.011 
F414 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F415 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F416 0.02 ± 0.00 0.70 ± 0.20 0.001 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.000 
F417 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F418 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F419 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F420 0.13 ± 0.03 6.20 ± 1.40 0.012 ± 0.003 0.013 ± 0.003 
F422 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F424 1.14 ± 0.26 53.50 ± 12.10 0.102 ± 0.023 0.109 ± 0.025 
F425 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F426 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F427 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
F428 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F429 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F430 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F431 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F432 0.23 ± 0.05 10.90 ± 2.50 0.021 ± 0.005 0.022 ± 0.005 
F433 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F434 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F435 0.28 ± 0.06 13.10 ± 3.00 0.025 ± 0.006 0.027 ± 0.006 
F436 0.78 ± 0.18 36.40 ± 8.20 0.070 ± 0.016 0.074 ± 0.017 
F437 0.73 ± 0.17 34.30 ± 7.70 0.066 ± 0.015 0.070 ± 0.016 
F438 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F443 0.05 ± 0.01 2.10 ± 0.50 0.004 ± 0.001 0.004 ± 0.001 
F444 1.17 ± 0.27 55.00 ± 12.40 0.105 ± 0.024 0.112 ± 0.025 
F445 0.91 ± 0.21 42.60 ± 9.60 0.081 ± 0.018 0.087 ± 0.020 
F446 0.63 ± 0.14 29.50 ± 6.70 0.056 ± 0.013 0.060 ± 0.014 
F447 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
F448 0.24 ± 0.06 11.40 ± 2.60 0.022 ± 0.005 0.023 ± 0.005 
F449 1.28 ± 0.29 60.20 ± 13.60 0.115 ± 0.026 0.123 ± 0.028 
F450 1.33 ± 0.30 62.60 ± 14.10 0.120 ± 0.027 0.127 ± 0.029 
F451 1.46 ± 0.33 68.50 ± 15.50 0.131 ± 0.030 0.140 ± 0.031 
F452 1.22 ± 0.28 57.40 ± 13.00 0.110 ± 0.025 0.117 ± 0.026 
F453 2.42 ± 0.55 113.80 ± 25.70 0.218 ± 0.049 0.232 ± 0.052 
F454 2.74 ± 0.62 128.70 ± 29.10 0.246 ± 0.056 0.262 ± 0.059 
F455 0.18 ± 0.04 8.60 ± 1.90 0.016 ± 0.004 0.017 ± 0.004 
F456 0.08 ± 0.02 3.60 ± 0.80 0.007 ± 0.002 0.007 ± 0.002 
F457 2.31 ± 0.52 108.50 ± 24.50 0.208 ± 0.047 0.221 ± 0.050 
F458 2.40 ± 0.54 112.60 ± 25.40 0.215 ± 0.049 0.229 ± 0.052 
F459 3.82 ± 0.87 179.40 ± 40.60 0.343 ± 0.077 0.365 ± 0.082 
F460 2.41 ± 0.55 113.30 ± 25.60 0.217 ± 0.049 0.231 ± 0.052 
F461 3.25 ± 0.74 152.30 ± 34.40 0.291 ± 0.066 0.310 ± 0.070 
F462 3.46 ± 0.78 162.50 ± 36.70 0.311 ± 0.070 0.331 ± 0.075 
F466 2.03 ± 0.46 95.20 ± 21.50 0.182 ± 0.041 0.194 ± 0.044 
F467 2.36 ± 0.53 110.70 ± 25.00 0.212 ± 0.048 0.225 ± 0.051 
F468 0.53 ± 0.12 25.00 ± 5.60 0.048 ± 0.011 0.051 ± 0.011 
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Table C-1. (continued). 
Can I.D. 
U-235
(kilograms) 
Total Uranium 
(kilograms) 
Pu-239 + Pu-241 
(kilograms) 
Total plutonium 
(kilograms) 
F469 2.97 ± 0.67 139.50 ± 31.50 0.267 ± 0.060 0.284 ± 0.064 
F470 2.51 ± 0.57 118.00 ± 26.70 0.226 ± 0.051 0.240 ± 0.054 
F471 4.59 ± 1.04 215.60 ± 48.70 0.412 ± 0.093 0.439 ± 0.099 
F473 2.79 ± 0.63 130.90 ± 29.60 0.250 ± 0.056 0.266 ± 0.060 
K501 5.62 ± 1.27 263.90 ± 59.70 0.505 ± 0.114 0.537 ± 0.121 
K502 0.73 ± 0.17 34.30 ± 7.70 0.066 ± 0.015 0.070 ± 0.016 
K504 6.34 ± 1.44 297.50 ± 67.20 0.569 ± 0.128 0.605 ± 0.137 
K506 9.42 ± 2.13 441.90 ± 99.90 0.845 ± 0.191 0.900 ± 0.203 
K507 2.70 ± 0.61 126.60 ± 28.60 0.242 ± 0.055 0.258 ± 0.058 
K508 2.31 ± 0.52 108.50 ± 24.50 0.208 ± 0.047 0.221 ± 0.050 
K513 8.10 ± 1.83 380.00 ± 85.90 0.727 ± 0.164 0.774 ± 0.174 
K519 0.49 ± 0.10 22.80 ± 5.20 0.044 ± 0.010 0.047 ± 0.010 
K520 1.53 ± 0.35 71.60 ± 16.20 0.137 ± 0.031 0.146 ± 0.033 
K521 0.37 ± 0.08 17.40 ± 3.90 0.033 ± 0.007 0.035 ± 0.008 
K523 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 
K563 0.64 ± 0.14 30.00 ± 6.80 0.057 ± 0.013 0.061 ± 0.014 
Totals 1801.12 81437.2 147.781 155.005 
D130 0.61 ± 0.01 20.40 ± 0.20 0.040 ± 0.010 0.040 ± 0.010 
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Appendix D 
TMI-2 Source Term Inventory 
The following data in Table D-1 represents the loading information for a combination of the 
D-153 canister and a repackaged TMI-2 (D-388) canister. 
The total heavy metal content reported for canister D-153 in Appendix C represents the 
as-shipped condition between Three Mile Island and the INEEL. Subsequent analysis of TMI-2 debris 
from various canisters, and subsequent repackaging lead to an increase in the reported the heavy metal 
contents for canister D-153 as shown in Table D-1. The details associated with this repackaging effort are 
documented in an engineering design file.D-1
Where the material in D-153 and D-388 retains their characteristics associated solely with TMI-2 
debris, there is an allowable straight line (or ratioed) extrapolation that can be applied to any other TMI-2 
canister for estimating radionuclide inventories. As an example applicable to the K506 canister, the 
radionuclide inventory for that canister would be a heavy-metal value of [(441.9 + 0.9)/19.08] = 23.2075 
times any radionuclide species. Such a calculation would also be applicable to estimating increased 
thermal power for other canisters. 
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Table D-1. Radionuclide inventory for the D-153 and D-388 canisters. 
I. Fuel and Template Information Estimated
Fuel Name:TMI-2 CORE DEBRIS (D-153 & 388)
1
Fuel decay start date: 1979 Canister usage:
SNF ID #:229 Estimates as of: 2003 18"x15'
Fuel Units & Descr:2 - DEBRIS Template: PWR (Light Water, Zirc, 0 to 5%, U) 2.00
Heavy Metal Mass: BOL=19.08kg;  EOL=19.01kg
2
Template Burnup(MWd): 61.92
ROD Storage Site:INEEL Template BOL Heavy Metal Mass (MT): 0.00176911
Current Location:INEEL,  TAN CASK STORAGE PAD  TAN-791 Template Decay Time: 20 years
II. Estimates m xn xb b yn yb
Radionuclide
Ci/MWd From 
Template
Nominal
Fuel Burnup (MWd) 2
Bounding Fuel 
Burnup (MWd)2
Initial Activity 
(Ci)
Nominal Fuel 
Inventories(Ci)
Bounding Fuel 
Inventories(Ci)
Photon 
Energy Group
Total 
Photons/sec 
(bounding)
Ac-227 5.0630E-10 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.37E-08 6.74E-08 Avg. MeV
Am-241 1.1489E-01 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 7.65E+00 1.53E+01 0.0150 1.019E+13
Am-242m 3.0733E-04 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 2.05E-02 4.09E-02 0.0250 2.074E+12
Am-243 6.2661E-04 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.17E-02 8.34E-02 0.0375 2.027E+12
C-14 4.7997E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.20E-03 6.39E-03 0.0575 2.129E+12
Cl-36 8.0313E-07 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 5.35E-05 1.07E-04 0.0850 1.167E+12
Cm-243 3.6127E-04 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 2.40E-02 4.81E-02 0.1250 8.835E+11
Cm-244 8.6999E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 5.79E+00 1.16E+01 0.2250 1.000E+12
Co-60 1.8379E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.22E+00 2.45E+00 0.3750 4.311E+11
Cs-134 6.2548E-03 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.16E-01 8.33E-01 0.5750 9.788E+12
Cs-135 1.4433E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 9.61E-04 1.92E-03 0.8500 2.536E+11
Cs-137 1.9767E+00 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.32E+02 2.63E+02 1.2500 3.809E+11
Eu-154 6.7603E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.50E+00 9.00E+00 1.7500 7.012E+09
Eu-155 1.4373E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 9.57E-01 1.91E+00 2.2500 1.626E+06
Fe-55 2.3466E-03 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.56E-01 3.12E-01 2.7500 1.141E+06
H-3 4.8143E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.20E+00 6.41E+00 3.5000 1.689E+05
I-129 9.8288E-07 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 6.54E-05 1.31E-04 5.0000 7.114E+04
Kr-85 7.4386E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.95E+00 9.90E+00 7.0000 8.202E+03
Np-237 1.0145E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 6.75E-04 1.35E-03 11.0000 9.422E+02
Pa-231 1.0258E-09 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 6.83E-08 1.37E-07
Pb-210 1.4163E-11 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 9.43E-10 1.89E-09
Pm-147 1.9170E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.28E+00 2.55E+00
Pu-238 8.3915E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 5.59E+00 1.12E+01
Pu-239 1.1628E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 7.74E-01 1.55E+00
Pu-240 1.5050E-02 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.00E+00
Pu-241 1.8524E+00 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.23E+02 2.47E+02
Pu-242 6.4260E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.28E-03 8.56E-03
Ra-226 6.0562E-11 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.03E-09 8.06E-09
Ra-228 4.9919E-12 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.32E-10 6.65E-10
Ru-106 1.8330E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.22E-03 2.44E-03
Se-79 1.2379E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 8.24E-04 1.65E-03
Sn-126 2.5210E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.68E-03 3.36E-03
Sr-90 1.3098E+00 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 8.72E+01 1.74E+02
Tc-99 3.9357E-04 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 2.62E-02 5.24E-02
Th-229 6.2968E-11 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 4.19E-09 8.38E-09
Th-230 1.0362E-08 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 6.90E-07 1.38E-06
Th-232 5.2891E-12 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.52E-10 7.04E-10
Tl-208 1.9977E-07 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.33E-05 2.66E-05
U-232 5.4490E-07 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 3.63E-05 7.25E-05
U-233 2.3934E-08 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 1.59E-06 3.19E-06
U-234 4.4816E-05 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 2.98E-03 5.97E-03
U-235 -1.4492E-06 66.57 0.00 1.29E-03 1.19E-03 1.29E-03
U-236 7.5711E-06 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 5.04E-04 1.01E-03 2.00E+00 3.99E+00
U-238 -2.6129E-07 66.57 0.00 6.21E-03 6.19E-03 6.21E-03 Total Total
Y-90 1.3101E+00 66.57 133.13 0.00E+00 8.72E+01 1.74E+02
Other Radionuclides 1.26E+02 2.53E+02
III. Template Selection Summary, Burnup Summary, and Checks
Template Selection Summary
From SFD Used Basis for Parameter Differences:
Reactor Moderator: LIGHT WATER LIGHT WATER
Fuel Cladding: ZIRC ZIRC
BOL HM Constituents: U U
BOL Enrichment %: 3.125 0 to 5
Burnup Summary (MWd)2 Basis for burnup used in estimate:
From SFD Estimated
Nominal: 60.58 66.57Nominal burnup calculated from the heavy metal mass destroyed.
Bounding: 113.81 133.13Bounding burnup assumed to be twice nominal burnup.
Checks
Fuel Radionuclide Inventory Worksheet
Gamma Sources
Thermal Power
Nominal Heat 
Output 
(Watts)
Bounding 
Heat Output 
(Watts)
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